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I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the Civil War, black Americans began acqumng land in 
earnest; by 1920 almost one million black families owned farms. Since 
then, black rural landownership has dropped by more than 98% and 
continues in rapid decline-there are now fewer than 19,000 black-operated 
farms left in America. 1 By contrast, white-operated farms dropped only by 
half, from about 5.5 million to 2.4 million.2 Commentators have offered as 
partial explanations the consolidation of inefficient small farms and intense 
racial discrimination in farm lending.3 However, even absent these factors, 
the unintended effects of old-fashioned American property law might have 
led to the same outcome. Because black farmers often did not make wills, 
their heirs took the land as co-owners. Over generations, co-owners 
multiplied, the farms became unmanageable, and the land was partitioned 
and sold, a seemingly inevitable "tragedy of the commons" in which too 
many owners waste a common resource.4 Black rural landownership may 
seem a dusty topic, peopled with hardscrabble tales of property past. 
Consider, though, the daunting possibility that property future-think 
biomedical research, post-apartheid restitution, hybrid residential 
associations, perhaps cyberspace-may have the same analytic structure, be 
subject to a similar punishing legal regime, and face the same fate as the 
black rural landowner. 
Overcoming the tragic fate of commons property should not be so hard. 
Until now, however, legal theorists have often worked within a framework 
that makes happier solutions difficult to imagine. Typically, theorists have 
relied on a thin utilitarian language yoked to a narrow conceptual map of 
property. One school, worrying that rational owners will overconsume 
commons resources, has embraced the so-called Blackstonian image of 
private property with "sole and despotic dominion" at the core.5 Another 
school, after showing how small, close-knit groups can successfully 
conserve commons resources if they sharply restrict exit, has advocated a 
version of commons property.6 For both schools, the image of tragic 
1. See infra Section IV.A (discussing the black fann example in detail). See generally U.S. 
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING IN AMERICA 3 tbl.1.1 (1982) 
[hereinafter BLACK FARMING] (describing this decline and its causes); 15.000 Blacks Seek Shares 
in Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at A25. 
2. BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
3. See, e.g., ROBERT s. BROWNE, ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES: THE DECLINE OF BLACK 
OWNED LAND IN IBE RURAL SOUTH 28-33 (1973); Too Little, Too Late: Black Farmers' 
Discrimination Settlement May Not Ease Years of Pain, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1999, at Al. 
4. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (introducing 
the metaphor); see also infra notes 36, 39 (discussing antecedents). 
5. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 347, 
354 (1967). On private property, see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; see also Carol 
M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and 
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 150-51 (1998), which discusses this image of private property. 
6. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GoVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITIJTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-36 (1990); Margaret A. McKean, Success on the Commons: A 
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outcomes proves an ideal foil, one that implicitly points theorists toward 
their preferred normative solutions. Privatization seems inevitable for 
utilitarians with a liberal bent, because they believe that locking people 
together violates a fundamental concern for individual autonomy. By 
contrast, illiberal communitarian solutions seem relatively attractive to 
those who are ready to sacrifice individual autonomy for collective goals. 
While these underlying normative commitments drive the familiar debate 
over tragic outcomes, they never surface as the focus for analysis of 
commons resource management. 
In this Article, we argue that linking the utilitarian vocabulary of 
economic success with the conceptual binary of private/commons property 
creates too paltry a framework when utility cannot be safely reduced to 
wealth alone, that is, when the social gains from cooperation are not just 
fringe benefits, but instead are a major part of what people seek. A better 
framework focuses more directly on the underlying normative 
commitments that animate the tragedy debate, and then challenges images 
that suggest their inevitable friction. Our approach also differentiates 
among resource dilemmas, for example, distinguishing "open access," in 
which anyone at all may use a resource and no one may be excluded, from 
"commons ownership," in which a bounded group, such as a farm family, 
controls access to a valuable resource.7 This Article does not discuss the 
often losing game of open access; rather, we focus exclusively on 
institutions for commons resource management where participation may be 
of the essence, the terms for exit matter, and the calculus of utility must 
account for incommensurable goals. 
For this (substantial) subset of commons ownership settings-
including, for example, marital property, partnerships, condominium 
associations, and close corporations-the polarizing vocabulary of the 
"tragedy of the commons" debate renders invisible the most difficult and 
important tradeoffs and unintentionally freezes legal imagination and 
innovation.8 There is no neutral, pre-political tragedy of the commons: The 
Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management, 4 J. 
IlIBORETICAL POL. 247, 261-62 (1992); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA 
L. REV. 1335, 1343-44 (1991). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 20-24 (discussing the mistaken conflation of open access 
and commons property). Though Garrett Hardin introduced the term "tragedy of the commons," 
Hardin, supra note 4, at 1244-45, each example he analyzed could more precisely, but less 
evocatively, have been described as a "tragedy of open access." Additionally, commons resource 
institutions may be evaluated along other salient axes, for example, whether restrictions on exit are 
property or contract based, infra text accompanying notes 79-83; creation is voluntary or involuntary, 
infra text accompanying note 134 and Subsection ID.B.3.b; man1gement is participatory or 
hierarchical, infra text accompanying note 180; and scope is limited or comprehensive, infra 
Subsection ill.B.3.b. 
8. Cf FELIX S. COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, in THE LEGAL 
CONSCIENCE: SELECTED p APERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 33 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960) (showing 
how legal conceptualism blocks ethical and empirical inquiry and shields the status quo from 
normative reexamination); Robert Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE PoLmcs OF 
LAW: A PROGRESSNE CRITIQUE 281, 287 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (stating that law is one of many 
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metaphor itself assumes either open access (anarchy or no law) or law that 
is hostile to cooperation. Rightly considered, the problem of managing 
commons resources concerns not only tragic outcomes, but also tragic 
choices: Are we doomed to choose between our liberal commitments and 
the economic and social benefits available in a commons? No. Well-
structured law can, and often does, mediate liberty and cooperation. Thus, 
we contest communitarian claims that elevate illiberal commons property 
and too quickly jettison individual autonomy; equally, we dispute the 
claims of privatizers who assert an exclusive preference for old-fashioned 
private property and who disparage cooperation. 
For many resources, the most appealing ownership form proves to be a 
participatory commons regime that also allows members the freedom to 
come and go. We call this structure a" liberal commons" -an ideal type of 
ownership distinct from both private and commons property, but drawing 
elements from each. Any legal regime can qualify as a liberal commons 
when it enables a limited group of owners to capture the economic and 
social benefits from cooperative use of a scarce resource, while also 
ensuring autonomy to individual members who retain a secure right to exit. 
Constructing a successful liberal commons is always challenging, but it is 
not an inherently contradictory or practically unattainable goal.9 
Legal regimes that account for a substantial and increasing share of 
social life-again, consider marital property, partnerships, condominiums, 
and close corporations--can be structured to be consonant with liberal 
commons goals. When well-tailored, these institutions encourage people 
voluntarily to come together to create limited-access and limited-purpose 
communities dedicated to shared management of a scarce resource. They 
offer internal governance mechanisms to facilitate participatory cooperation 
and the peaceable joint creation of wealth, while simultaneously limiting 
minority oppression and allowing exit. On their own, people are already 
creating pervasive, though unremarked variations on liberal commons 
themes. We provide a roadmap so law can better support their efforts. 
The liberal commons construct should prove useful because it does not 
simply revisit ongoing liberty/community and private/commons debates. 
Instead, it reorganizes these debates altogether around a richer set of 
questions and answers. On the questions front, we expand the evaluative 
prism for commons resource management from a sole focus on economic 
success to a broader view that explicitly includes the liberal value of exit as 
well as noneconomic goals such as the intrinsic good of interpersonal 
cooperation. We offer a consistent analytic language engaging precisely the 
"clusters of belief," "which are profoundly paralysis-inducing because they make it so hard for 
people ... even to imagine that life could be different and better"). 
9. As Michael Walzer notes. "[i]f we want the mutual reinforcements of community and 
individuality to serve a common interest, we will have to act politically to make them effective. 
They require certain background or framing conditions that can only be provided by state action." 
MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 111 (1997). 
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widely shared values that seem to animate our most important commons 
resource institutions. Also, on a descriptive level, our construct does better 
than existing property categories at explaining how these institutions work. 
On the answers front, an attractive feature of our approach is that it bounds 
the range of solutions consonant with liberal commons values: Our 
normative umbrella, while capacious, is not unlimited. We employ widely 
shared conceptions of autonomy (as including a commitment to free exit) 
and community (as both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable) to 
provide the liberal commons with a critical edge and normative yardstick. 
Across the wide variety of existing institutions where it may be deployed, 
our construct often yields persuasive arguments for legal reform. By 
rethinking the important questions and answers, and by intertwining 
descriptive and normative elements, our interpretive approach yields a 
strong result: We can help reconstruct many areas of law so they are more 
consistent with their animating values, 10 and we can confine the tragedy of 
the commons metaphor to its proper, limited place in legal theory. 
The goals of this Article are to advance a theory of the liberal commons 
and to demonstrate its usefulness. Part II introduces the problem of tragic 
choice. Relying on the private/commons dichotomy, theorists have chosen 
between liberal and communitarian solutions to commons tragedy. Because 
they have overlooked the liberal commons synthesis, they have missed how 
law can shift debate in a happier direction. Part III proposes a theory of the 
liberal commons that engages the problem of tragic choice. We explore the 
widely shared, often buried, and potentially competing goals that law must 
reconcile when people want to cooperate in managing a scarce resource but 
fear abuse. We then discuss the background role that law can play in 
guiding human behavior. Finally, we set out the three spheres of 
decisionmaking that characterize the general form of the liberal commons 
solution-the spheres of individual dominion, democratic self-governance, 
and cooperation-enhancing exit. These three spheres are the core innovation 
of our theory: They provide a coherent language for exploring the recurring 
problems that law must address whenever it mediates liberty and 
cooperation in commons ownership settings. Part IV rewards the reader's 
patience with legal theory by bringing the liberal commons down to earth. 
The example of declining black landownership is complex; we use it here 
for the limited purpose of suggesting how the American law of co-
ownership may systematically thwart cooperation. Current law fails them, 
and us, because it lacks the three features of a liberal commons, features 
that, we show, exist in other developed legal systems and are potentially 
available in our own. While a liberal commons solution may be too late for 
black farmers, their example can still catalyze useful reforms. 
10. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 52-53 (1986) (developing an interpretive method 
that "strives to make an object the best it can be" ). 
2001] The Liberal Commons 555 
Can a liberal legal regime facilitate economically and socially 
productive use of scarce resources in a crowded world where people want 
or need to work together but worry that others may take advantage of them? 
A theory of the liberal commons begins to provide an answer. 
II. TRAGIC CHOICE IN PROPERTY THEORY 
Most lawyers, economists, and other social scientists learn of the 
"tragedy of the commons" in the first weeks of school, 11 and all are taught 
that commons property is the axiomatic example of a prisoner's dilemma.12 
The usual economics-oriented reaction has been to build from tragedy to 
private property; political theorists, by contrast, often solve tragedy by 
focusing on thickly textured norms and the bonds of close-knit community. 
Neither camp gives much focused attention to the role of law or to any 
values other than economic success measured along a single metric. This 
Part shows how the existing conceptual map pushes theorists into these 
dichotomous approaches and renders invisible some of the most 
challenging dilemmas that underlie management of commons resources. 
A. A Typology of Property Forms 
1. The Standard Conceptual Map 
Commons property takes its place alongside private property and state 
property as part of the well-worn trilogy of ownership forms that constitute 
the conceptual apparatus of property law. 13 These three species of property 
are generally understood as ideal types, never present in pure form on the 
ground, but always available to channel the justificatory and normative 
debates that are of ultimate interest to legal theorists and reformers. 14 The 
process of working from idealized types pervades property theory, 
stretching back past Locke's discussion of ownership and forward to 
modem images of the commons. 
The trilogy is so entrenched as to seem almost natural, beyond serious 
contestation or elaboration. Even to suggest tinkering raises a red flag for 
11. See, e.g., JESSEDUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 40-59 (4th ed. 1998). 
12. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33-34 (1994); 
AVINASH K. DIXIT& BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 347-49 (1991). 
13. On the limitations imposed by the standard conceptual map, see generally Michael A. 
Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 7 (2000). For the 
familiar definitions, see, for example, JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1988); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Properry and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 711, 715-16 (1980); and Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of 
Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 5-6 (1982). 
14. For example, Frank Michelman states, "[w]e need some reasonably clear conceptions of 
regimes that are decidedly not [private property], with which [private property) regimes can be 
compared." Michelman, supra note 13, at 5. 
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legal theorists. 15 Nevertheless, the ground is shifting under these old 
categories to the point that they divert us from seeing new problems and 
opportunities. Before showing how modem theorists have crafted a crabbed 
version of the commons, we set commons property in its familiar habitat, 
nestled alongside private property and state property. 
a. Private Property 
Private property is a difficult idea to pin down precisely; its boundaries 
always fray at the edges. However, for legal theorists (and, even more so, 
for ordinary lay folk16), the term seems reasonably coherent and capable of 
simple definition. For example, Jeremy Waldron defines rules of private 
property " around the idea that contested resources are to be regarded as 
separate objects each assigned to the decisional authority of some particular 
individual (or family or firm)." 17 This simple definition can be multiplied 
many times over, but all such definitions partake of and help keep current 
William Blackstone's oft-repeated definition of private property as "that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe." 18 The image of sole dominion has never 
adequately described any real-world property ownership, as Blackstone 
himself recognized. 19 Nevertheless, his image endures through the ages and 
continues to serve as a focal point for thinking about property, even as 
people trade old-fashioned private property for the property arrangements 
that we here call the liberal commons. 
b. Commons Property 
Some theorists define commons property as a regime in which every 
individual may use an object of property and no individual has the right to 
15. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Too Much Property, 21 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 196, 197-98 
(1992). But even Becker notes that" we would lose a great deal of clarity and rigor if [the conceptual 
apparatus] were ignored." Id. at 198. 
16. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 116-18 (1977) 
(exploring the lay view of property). 
17. Jeremy Waldron, Property Law, in A COMPANION TO PHIWSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 3, 6 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). Frank Michelman focuses attention on his definition of 
rules for initial acquisition and reassignment He focuses particularly on the ideas of sole ownership, 
defined to mean that "[t]he rules must allow that at least some objects of utility or desire can be fully 
owned by just one person," and freedom of transfer, defined to mean that "[o]wners are both 
immune from involuntary deprivation or modification of their ownership rights and empowered to 
transfer their rights to others at will, in whole or in part." Michelman, supra note 13, at 5. 
18. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *2; see also JOHN l..OCKE, Two TREATISES OF 
GoVERNMENT 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (basing a theory of 
private property on the principle that labor removes a resource from the commons and makes it 
the exclusive property of the laborer). 
19. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *212-15; Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1315, 1362 n.237 (1993); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk. or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 
108 Y ALEL.J. 601, 602 (1998). 
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stop someone else from using the object.20 Commentators have repeatedly 
noted that this standard definition obscures an important distinction 
between commons property and open access.21 Open access (or anarchy or 
no law) is a "scheme of universally distributed, all-encompassing" 
privilege.22 By contrast, commons property designates resources that are 
owned or controlled by a finite number of people who manage the resource 
together and exclude outsiders, 23 what Carol Rose calls "commons on the 
inside, [private] property on the outside." 24 
This important distinction notwithstanding, the image of open access 
still constitutes the core understanding of commons property, at least in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. As in the open access case, commons 
property owners are often imagined to be entitled to unregulated use of the 
commons resource and entitled to a governance regime in which no control 
on resource use-no management or investment decision---can be imposed 
on any single commoner absent that individual's consent. 
c. State Property 
State property, also called collective property, has been equally central 
to standard narratives of property.25 As Waldron notes, state property can be 
defined as a property regime in which, "in principle, material resources are 
answerable to the needs and purposes of society as a whole, whatever they 
are and however they are determined, rather than to the needs and purposes 
of particular individuals considered on their own." 26 Thus, a state property 
regime is similar to commons property in that no individual stands in a 
specially privileged position with regard to any resource, but it is 
20. Thus, Frank Michelman defines a commons property regime as one where "there are 
never any exclusionary rights. All is privilege. People are legally free to do as they wish, and are 
able to do, with whatever objects (conceivably including persons) are in the [commons]." 
Michelman, supra note 13, at 5. 
21. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LoBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 143 (1988); OSTROM, supra note 6, 
at 48, 222 n.23; GLENN G. STEVENSON, COMMON PROPERTY EcONOMICS: A GENERAL THEORY 
AND LAND USE APPLICATIONS 8-10, 39-40 (1991); Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1322; Carol M. 
Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 
DUKE L.J. l, 3 n.4; Thrainn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property 8-9 (Oct. 2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal) ("The treatment of common property 
in the literature is engulfed in confusion. The focal point of the confusion often is [Hardin• s paper] 
that actually discusses open access and its consequences .... In retrospect, the confusion over the 
nature of common property probably was caused substantially by a mix-up of proper names and 
theoretical categories."). 
22. Michelman, supra note 13, at 9 (discussing commons property). 
23. OSTROM, supra note 6, at 48, 222 n.23. 
24. Rose, supra note 5, at 155. ln other words, despite the similarities between open access 
and commons property (multiple users and the resulting collective action difficulties), commons 
property is also characterized by an important feature similar to private ownership: In both cases, 
the users' group is strictly defined. STEVENSON, supra note 21, at 57; Ellickson, supra note 19, at 
1322. 
25. E.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
26. WALDRON, supra note 13, at 40 & n.30. 
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distinguished from commons property because the state has a special status 
or distinct interest.27 Although state property has often been considered the 
main rival of private property,28 it has become a less and less important 
category, particularly since state socialism collapsed and privatization has 
prevailed more and more in theoretical and policy debates.29 Hence, the 
trilogy of property forms often reduces in practice to a dichotomy of private 
or commons.30 
2. Focusing the Debate 
The familiar conceptual map has limited debate in three distinct ways.31 
First, as Heller has shown, the categorization is incomplete, and adding new 
types such as anticommons property may help make visible previously 
overlooked problems.32 Second, as Dagan has argued, the existing 
categories, such as" private property," may themselves be renegotiated and 
a richer, alternative conception developed.33 Third, and the focus of thi~ 
27. Id. at 41. Additionally, as Waldron suggests, state property is not just a special case of a 
private property regime, where the state just acts as another private owner. Instead, at a theoretical 
level, the state is somehow expressing the collective interest in determining how a state property 
resource is to be used. The collective, represented usually by the state, hold~ all rights of exclusion 
and is the unitary locus of decisionmaking regarding the use of resources. So, a subsidiary set of 
questions needs to be answered to specify fully a state property regime, including what the 
"collective interest" is and what procedures will be used to apply that conception to a particular 
resource. Id. at 40. 
28. Indeed, part of the political science literature on the commons has come as a response to 
this "false dichotomy." OSTROM, supra note 6, at 8-13; Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson, 
Human Ecology of the Commons, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE ANp 
ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 1, 7, 9, 13 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 
1987). 
29. To be sure, private property systems do contain, and it seems must contain, public 
elements, typically organized as state property, such as highways, streets, and public parks. 
Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1381 & n.342, 1397 n.413 (noting the scale and inevitability of public 
space in cities); Rose, supra note 25, at 723 (discussing the effect of state property in enhancing 
community wealth as well as sociability). 
30. E.g., YORAM BARZEL, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 99 (2d ed. 1997) 
(stating that the standard economic analysis of property "tend[ed] to classify ownership status into 
all-or-nothing categories, the latter being termed 'common property' ---property that has no 
restrictions placed on its use"). 
31. See generally Heller, supra note 13 (elaborating this argument). 
32. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-26 (1998). In an anticommons, too many owners 
may each exclude others from a resource, the mirror image of a commons with a mirror tragedy: 
Resources ·may be prone to waste through underuse, rather than from overuse. Heller's image of 
anticommons property, and the tragedy that can ensue, shows how breaking out of the old trilogy 
can crystallize emerging property relations that otherwise remain invisible. Id. at 633-42 
(discussing the consequences of misguided privatization of state property in postsocialist 
economies); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (showing how efforts to spur 
private investment in biomedical research by granting property rights may paradoxically result in 
fewer drugs that save lives). 
33. Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138, 
149 (1999). Dagan advocates a progressive conception of private property that incorporates our 
commitments to social responsibility and to equality. According to this conception, private property 
is not merely a bundle of rights, but also a social institution that creates bonds of commitment and 
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work, we show that there is significant analytic and normative traction to be 
gained from synthesizing features of existing types, private and commons, 
to create vigorous hybrids including the liberal commons.34 There is a 
subtle distinction to be made here: Our new construct is intended to reflect 
a distinct ideal type of ownership, one that operates at the same level of 
analysis as private or commons property; it does not refer to the 
opportunistic mix of private and commons elements that typically appears 
in any particularized resource management regime.35 
The seemingly immutable opposition of p~vate and commons blinkers 
legal scholars from imagining hybrid legislative and judicial solutions; it 
presents the tragic but false choice of privatizing a resource or locking 
people together. Our liberal commons ideal type offers an analytic tool that 
deliberately elides the familiar legal opposition of private and commons, as 
well as the more fundamental normative orientation toward liberty or 
community. 
B. Commons Tragedy as Privatization Foil 
1. From Demsetz ... 
Echoing a familiar Aristotelian theme,36 the conventional wisdom for 
many social scientists is that commons property generally leads to 
responsibility among owners and others who live or work with the owner, or are otherwise 
affected by the owner's properties. Furthermore, private property necessarily entails distribution, 
since it is a source of economic and, therefore, also social, political, and cultural rights and 
powers, the correlative of which are other people's duties and liabilities. Hanoch Dagan, Just 
Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2000); 
Hanoch Dagan, Takings arui Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 772-73, 779-81, 791-92 
(1999). 
34. See Carol M. Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the New law arui &onomics of 
Propeny, 79 OR. L. REv. 479 (2000) (discussing limited commons property hybrids). 
35. Robert Ellickson suggests two relevant types of organizational diversity, two 
manifestations of the eclecticism of land regimes: either variations in the "initial bundles of rights 
and transfer .rules" or opportunistic mixtures of public and private ownership. Ellickson, supra 
note 19, at 1387-88. The liberal commons construct relates only to the former type. For an 
example of the other type, consider Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Propeny Rights arui Scattering 
in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000), which characterizes the medieval open-
field system as a "semicommons." The resource is "owned and used in common for one major 
purpose, but, with respect to some other major purpose, individual economic units ... have 
property rights to separate pieces of the commons." Id. 
36. ARISTOTLE, 1lIE POLITICS (H. Rackham trans., 1932). A classic passage is: 
Property that is common to the greatest number of owners receives the least 
attention; men care most for their private possessions, and for what they own in 
common less, or only so far as it falls to their own individual share; for in addition to 
the other reasons, they think less of it on the ground that someone else is thinking about 
it .... 
Id. at bk. 2, ch. 1, § 10 (Bekker§ 1261b30-35). Also consider: 
[R]egulations for the common ownership of property would give more causes for 
discontent; for if both in the enjoyment of the produce and in the work of production 
they prove not equal but unequal, complaints are bound to arise between those who 
enjoy or take much but work little and those who take less but work more. And in 
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tragedy.37 This claim-a truism of first-year law classes-is usually 
introduced as one of the strongest justifications for the institution of private 
property.38 Although Garrett Hardin coined the term "the tragedy of the 
commons," 
39 Harold Demsetz was the fust theorist to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis that aimed systematically to establish the long-run 
superiority of private property over commons property.40 
Demsetz discussed three types of costs from commons property 
regimes-increased negotiating costs because of holdouts; increased 
policing or monitoring costs; and the difficulties of too high a discount rate 
that lead commoners to fail to internalize fully the interests of future 
generations.41 Private property, he claimed, generally solves these problems 
general to live together and share all our human affairs is difficult, and especially to 
share such things as these [farms and produce]. 
ld. at ch. 2, § 2-3 (Bekker § 1263a10-l 7). 
37. Much influential recent thinking on property rights has itself been influenced by 
divergent camps of economists-such as Demsetz, Alchian, North, and others-who have 
extrapolated from the historical experience of Western European and American capitalism. For a 
sampling of classics, see BARZEL, supra note 30; DoUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL 
THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973); Armen A. 
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 777 (1972); Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. 
EcoN. HIST. 16 (1973); Demsetz, supra note 5; Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property 
Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. EcON. LIT. 1137 (1972); 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and the Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); and Svetozar Pejovich, Towards 
an Economic Theory of the Creation and Specification of Property Rights, 30 REV. SOC. EcON. 
309 (1972). 
Id. 
38. E.g., GoTTFRIED DIETZE, lN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 9 ( 1963). Dietze explains: 
[T]he institution of private property has been defended on the grounds of justice, 
freedom, progress, peace and happiness .... Common ownership, although enjoying 
temporary vogues, has been rejected as utopian, as incompatible with the good of 
society and the individual, as productive of quarrels, as retarding development, as 
restraining freedom, as arbitrary and unjust. · 
39. Hardin, supra note 4. Before Hardin, H. Scott Gordon identified the tragedy without so 
labeling it. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 
62 J. PoL. EcON. 124 (1954). Hardin claimed that rational co-owners are bound to underinvest in the 
common resource, while overexploiting it. Hardin, supra note 4, at 1244-45. But he never considered 
the costs of any other legal arrangement, in particular the establishment and maintenance of a private 
property regime. As Michael Taylor points out: 
Every solution, every combination of property rights and controls, has its costs. 
Private property rights are not cos ties sly created, modified, and enforced; state 
regulation does not come free; and both may have effects which it is impossible to cost. 
What solution is best must surely depend to some extent on the relative costs of the 
possible solutions. Hardin ignores them. 
Michael Taylor, The Economics and Politics of Property Rights and Common Pool Resources, 32 
NAT. REs. J. 633, 635 (1992). 
40. Demsetz, supra note 5. 
41. Id. at 354-56. The difficulties posed by free riders for collective action were recognized by 
jurist~ long before the recent law-and-economics scholarship, as the following Jewish law example 
demonstrates. Rabbi Hayyim Yair Bachrach of Gennany (d. 1701) addressed the validity of a 
stipulation in a contract between some members of a community and an expert in shofar (ram's horn) 
blowing, according to which the ritual service is to be performed only in the name of the paying 
members of the community. In his opinion, R. Bachrach noted that the stipulation should apparently 
be classified as the type in which "one benefits and the other sustains no loss" (Pareto superiority in 
modern language), a type to which the applicable Jewish law rule was "exemption," that is, the 
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by concentrating costs and benefits on owners, thus creating incentives to 
use resources more efficiently.42 Demsetz was fully aware that these costs 
do not disappear in a private property regime, but he insisted that they 
would be dramatically reduced.43 His account also includes an evolutionary 
story that explains how private property rights develop to internalize these 
externalities when pressure increases on the use of a resource.44 The 
evolutionary part of his celebrated contribution has been rightly criticized, 
and the problem remains a puzzle.45 But Demsetz' s first proposition, that 
private property is more cost-beneficial once demand pressures are high 
enough, remains the conventional wisdom. 
2. . .. to Recent Law and Economics 
Over the years, Demsetz's account has been somewhat refined. Terry 
Anderson and P.J. Hill offer a more rigorous account of the benefits and 
costs of private property rights definition-and-enforcement activity.46 
Variables such as the crime rate, population density, cultural and ethical 
attitudes, and the preexisting "rules of the game" of the institutional 
stipulation could not operate to deprive nonpaying members from the spiritual benefits of the 
contract. But R. Bachrach was also attentive to the detrimental incentive effects (free-riding) of 
applying the exemption rule in these circumstances. His result seems unavoidable: The contracting 
members were indeed allowed to restrict the group of spiritual beneficiaries of the shofar blowing to 
themselves only. R. HAYYIM Y AIR BACHRACH, Responsum 186, in REsPONSA HA VAT Y AIR ( 1997). 
42. Demsetz, supra note 5, at 356-57. 
43. Id. at 356. 
44. Id. at 350-53. Private property rights "arise when it becomes economic for those affected by 
externalities to internalize benefits and costs." Id at 354; see also Hardin, supra note 4, at 1245 
(explaining the increasing negative effects of freedom in a commons). 
45. James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 325, 
336-38 & n.44 (1992) (arguing that both Hardin and Demsetz end up begging the same question, 
assuming the same problem away, and implicitly arguing that a community plagued by 
noncooperation can improve its condition by cooperating); see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra 
note 11, at 56, 59 (noting that theory and empirical evidence suggest that values and other 
variables prevent this evolutionary pattern from occurring in all situations); Carol M. Rose, 
Property as Storytelling: Prespectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990) (proposing that after-the-fact narratives are necessary to explain 
the development of property regimes, because they do not always unfold as logic predicts). Jim 
Krier has reported to us that Demsetz has replied to the many criticisms of his theory by saying, 
"That's why I called it 'Toward a Theory of Property Rights."' 
46. Terry L. Anderson & PJ. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American 
West, 18 J.L. & EcON. 163 (1975). They argue that increasing levels of definition-and-enforcement 
activity lead to benefits because of the increased probability that people will be able to appropriate an 
asset's worth. To elaborate, the benefit from property rights definition depends upon the value of the 
asset and the degree to which the activity ensures that the value will be captured by the owner. Any 
change in the price of the well-defined and well-enforced bundle of rights changes the return on 
resources devoted to property rights questions. Furthermore, any increase in the productivity of a 
definition-and-enforcement activity will shift the marginal benefit curve outward. An increase in the 
probability of loss of an asset will usually result in an increase in the productivity of property rights 
activity and thus will result in such a shift. Marginal benefits are also likely a declining function as 
definition-and-enforcement activity increases (for reasons similar to the declining marginal physical 
product of any input in general). Conversely, the marginal costs of property rights reorganization are 
increasing because of the opportunity cost of resources used in property rights definition activities. 
Id.; see also Smith, supra note 35, at 164 (making a similar claim). 
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structure affect the probability of securing benefits from better-defined 
private property rights. Anything that reduces the quantity of resources that 
is necessary for definition-and-enforcement activity or lowers the 
opportunity cost of such resources-such as changes in technology, in 
resource endowments, or in the scale of operation-will affect marginal 
costs. The equilibrium level of property rights definition-and-enforcement 
activity occurs where marginal benefit and cost curves intersect. Anderson 
and Hill argue that the contingency of factors influencing costs and benefits 
explains why we observe varying degrees of definition-and-enforcement 
activity and thus varying degrees of property arrangements covering the 
spectrum from commons to private. But their model does not dispute 
Demsetz's most fundamental claim: that increasing demand requires a 
move away from commons property toward private property.47 Commons 
property may be temporarily efficient, but in time, as the demand for scarce 
resources inevitably increases, privatization prevails.48 
Robert Ellickson refines the cost-benefit analysis further, but implicitly 
still shares in the fundamental claim regarding the demise of commons 
property.49 Ellickson distinguishes among the advantages of individual 
ownership in what he terms "small," "medium," and "large" events, each 
with rather different cost-benefit analyses. 50 He acknowledges the possible 
merits of commons property only with regard to one category, that of large 
events. Group ownership of land can sometimes be advantageous, he 
explains, because of "increasing returns to scale and the desirability of 
spreading risks." 51 But the examples he gives for cases in which economies 
of scale and risk-spreading favor commons property-three pioneer 
47. Similarly, Steven Cheung has shown that various property arrangements may be efficient 
and that individuals therefore choose different contract arrangements under varying conditions, 
though he has also maintained that this variation must remain within a private property regime to 
achieve efficient outcomes. STEVEN N.S. CHEUNG, THE THEORY OF SHARE TENANCY 4, 158 
(1969). Challenging other economists' conclusions that share tenancy is a less efficient system 
than fixed rents, Cheung focuses on transaction costs and risk to develop a theory that explains the 
divergence of property arrangements. Id. at 30, 63-77. 
48. See also JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 69 (1997) (arguing that 
although "in some situations commons work," scarcity generally" give[s] rise to conflict," and thus 
"the general point" -the "obvious solution" -is "to link rights of use with rights of exclusion," 
namely, private property). 
49. Ellickson, supra note 19. 
50. Respecting small events, Ellickson identifies three basic reasons for the relative 
efficiency of individual private property in terms of monitoring costs: Self-control by one person 
is simpler than the multiperson coordination entailed by intragroup monitoring; detecting a 
trespasser is less demanding than evaluating the conduct of persons otherwise privileged to use a 
resource; and policing boundaries or carrying out other monitoring functions is easier for an 
individual landowner, who will be more highly motivated than a member of a commons group. 
Likewise, Ellickson identifies three advantages of individual ownership with regard to medium 
events: Excessive dependence on coordination through a large number of transactions can be 
avoided; cooperation becomes more probable because of relatively multiplex relationships among 
neighbors; and dispute settlement arising out of medium events can be relegated to those persons 
most likely to be informed about the controversy. Id. at 1327-32. 
51. Id. at 1332. 
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settlements in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries52-are indeed exotic 
and almost idiosyncratic, especially from the perspective of a modern 
market economy. 
Only a few economics-oriented authors have challenged Demsetz' s 
underlying proposition, the most prominent of whom is Barry Field.53 
Field's insight derives from recent research in European social history that 
strongly suggests that communal agricultural property was antedated by a 
system that was more individualistic, carried out on small, individual fields 
rather than in communal lots. Hence, Field suggests that property-rights 
economists need to explain two opposite changes using just one causal 
factor: They need to show how population growth in one period could 
produce a shift from individual to common tenures, and later produce a 
shift from commons to individual property. Field suggests that plausible 
circumstances could be identified where developmental pressures 
encourage greater use of common, rather than individual, property.54 His 
analysis generates some indeterminacy in the economic inevitability of 
shifting to private property with increasing pressure on a resource. While a 
cliallenge to the conventional economic wisdom, Field's move is only a 
first step for our purposes. 
To develop a theory of a liberal commons, we must consider the 
possibility of successful management of commons resources not as an 
intermediate condition but as an end state, and we must learn the 
prerequisites for such success. Hardin, Demsetz, Anderson and Hill, 
Ellickson, and many others have helped to establish a sense of the 
inevitability of privatization and the necessary failure of commons 
ownership. The economic literature takes us only so far in countering that 
52. Id. at 1335-41. 
53. Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319 (1989); see also Fikret 
Berkes, Cooperation from the Perspective of Human Ecology, in COMMON PROPERTY 
REsOURCES: ECOLOGY AND COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 70, 79-82, 84 
(Fikret Birkes ed., 1989) (arguing that cycles in intensity of resource use can bring cycles of 
common-resource management, and describing Cree Amerindian hunting territories as an example 
of "the evolution, demise and subsequent recovery (more than once) of communal resource-
management systems"). 
54. Field, supra note 53, at 319-20, 328. To see why, consider the impact of increases in 
demand on the costs and benefits of establishing and maintaining a private property regime. As 
Demsetz claims, the increasing value of output justifies some additional costs in creating and 
maintaining a system of private property; the higher returns possible in a system of private property 
justify the accompanying increase in exclusion costs. Demsetz, supra note 5. Field insists, however, 
that this analysis is incomplete because it takes exclusion costs as given. But the effectiveness of 
resources devoted to exclusion depends on the incentives that exist for encroachment, which are 
related to the derived value of the resource. If the resource has no value, there would be little 
incentive to encroach, and thus it would be relatively easy to exclude, other things being equal. So an 
increase in the value of output could be expected to increase the incentive for encroachment, which 
implies that additional resources are required to achieve the same effective level of exclusion that 
obtained before. If this effect is particularly strong, it may overcome the effect identified by Demsetz 
and lead to commons property as the ultimate outcome. Cf Field, supra note 53, at 329 
(demonstrating similar ambiguous effects with respect to population growth). 
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sentiment; political theorists push the debate further, perhaps too far in the 
other direction. 
C. Commons Tragedy as Communitarian Foil 
In sharp contrast to the role commons property plays in neoclassical 
economic-legal theory, many political scientists (and some new institutional 
economists) have come to celebrate another version of commons property.55 
Political theorists have supplied a wealth of case studies of well-functioning 
commons property regimes around the globe, thus demonstrating 
empirically the falsity of claims (or assumptions) that commons property 
regimes are bound to generate tragic outcomes, defined in terms of wasted 
resources.56 They teach that neither privatization nor regulation is the only 
way to conserve scarce resources and manage them productively.57 
However, these accounts also show-albeit often implicitly-that commons 
success stories typically compromise individuals' right to exit, and 
therefore they do not do much to help establish our claims for a liberal 
commons. 
1. From Taylor ... 
A recent debate between two leading scholars of this group, Michael 
Taylor and Elinor Ostrom, illustrates our arguments. Taylor believes that 
"[c]ommunity with mutual vulnerability is what endows some groups with 
the means to regulate their commons endogenously." 58 For him, a 
community is a more or less stable set of members with some shared 
beliefs, including normative beliefs and preferences beyond those 
constituting their collective action problem, who expect to continue 
interacting with one another for some time to come, and whose relations are 
direct (unmediated by third parties) and multiplex (concerning a range of 
issues on which there can be give and take). Stable membership, continuing 
interaction, and direct and multiplex relationships, Taylor explains, all 
make mutual monitoring easy and cheap. 
55. One focal point for this group of scholars appears to be the International Association for 
the Study of Common Property (IASCP). which holds an annual convention drawing hundreds. 
McKean, supra note 6, at 250 n.4. 
56. Of course, there are also numerous counterexamples, where locking people together to 
manage a resource has disastrous effects. To give one particularly poignant example, consider 
United States policy toward Native American land holdings, which has led to a classic tragedy of 
the anticommons. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 
1163, 1213-17 (1999) (discussing the consequences of a federal allotment policy that prohibited 
alienation yet did not provide any collective governance mechanism for managing land resources). 
57. See, e.g., McCay & Acheson, supra note 28, at 7, 9, 13. 
58. Sara Singleton & Michael Taylor, Common Property, Collective Action and Community, 4 
J. lllEORETICALPoL. 309, 311 (1992). 
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The success of commons property, in other words, comes exclusively 
from factors within the group and is premised on the group's social 
cohesion. Therefore, Taylor concludes, success also depends on a lack of 
great economic or social differences among the community members. 
Differences in income, wealth, or class positions, or in ethnicity, race, caste, 
language, or religion, weaken or undermine his conditions for community 
and thus threaten the success of commons property.59 
2. . .. to Ostrom 
Ostrom claims, correctly in our view, that Taylor's story relegates the 
commons to a marginal status in contemporary circumstances, irrelevant for 
larger, heterogeneous, and changing sets of individuals.60 Ostrom represents 
another genre of commons theorists who are more useful for our purposes. 
Strong community, she claims, is neither sufficient nor ex ante necessary 
for solving resource dilemmas in commons property. Even heterogenous 
sets of individuals may overcome the commons difficulties with the help of 
proper institutional innovation and design, although if they do not develop 
shared values, they will eventually f ail.61 Ostrom studies institutional 
arrangements that help groups break out of the commons trap. Thus, in her 
celebrated book Governing the Commons, she demonstrates how these 
arrangements may distinguish between cases of long-enduring commons 
and cases of failures and fragilities.62 
Any attempt to devise a theory of the liberal commons must take 
account of Ostrom's design principles. Before doing so, however, we must 
consider an important question of relevance that arises from her work. 
Notwithstanding her opposition to Taylor's extreme communitarianism, 
59. MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 104-29 (1982); Singleton & 
Taylor, supra note 58, at 316. 
60. Elinor Ostrom, Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems, 4 J. 
THEORETICAL POL. 343, 347 (1992). But cf. Fred P. Bosselrnan, Replaying the Tragedy of the 
Commons, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 399-400 (1996) (reviewing ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, 
GAMES AND COMMON-PoOL REsOURCES (1994)) ("[T]he solution of common resource problems 
becomes both more difficult and more important as the scale of the resource grows."). 
61. Ostrom, supra note 60, at 347-50; see also, e.g., Lawrence Taylor, "The River Would Run 
Red with Blood": Community and Common Property in an Irish Fishing Settlement, in THE 
QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 28, at 290, 305--06 (distinguishing between "traditional 
communities," which understand collective ownership as natural, rather than derived from discrete 
decisions to cooperate, and "contractual communities," whose conceptions of community and 
common property have more specific origins, and noting that contractual communities frequently 
manage common resources through institutions and may be" equally 'close-knit'"). 
62. OSTROM, supra note 6, at 58-102, 143-81; see also Field, supra note 53, at 321, 335-40. 
Field argues that both the exclusion of noncommoners (the costs of private property) and the 
transactions among commoners (the costs of commons property) are carried out by the collectivity. 
Thus, "we can look on political innovations as also having a distinct role to play in determining 
efficient property institutions in a society." Field, supra note 53, at 337. More specifically, 
innovations in institutions of internal common governance may facilitate commons property, 
whereas innovations in the institutions of boundary maintenance and exclusion support private 
property. 
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Ostrom' s genre also implies an important illiberal component that she does 
not confront because of her exclusive focus on rebutting the neoclassical 
economists' "tragic outcome" story. Ostrom' s success stories, as well as 
most others reported in the literature, include strong limitations on 
alienability. In the purest case, there is no market in which rights to the 
commons can be bought, leased, or exchanged. Rights are conferred only 
on a particular class of eligible persons and may not be transferred to 
persons outside of that class. In a few systems, the sale of shares is allowed, 
but only to other eligible users of the commons, never to outsiders. These 
inalienabilities strengthen the bonds among co-owners and reinforce their 
rights in the commons, thus facilitating their cooperation.63 
Ostrom and her allies do not even consider that the price of their 
commons successes-which require locking people together in static 
communities-may be too dear, particularly for those who place a high 
value on individual liberty. If commons property can succeed only by 
giving up the right to exit, a liberal commons is indeed an oxymoron. While 
it is neither liberalism's sole characteristic nor a goal beyond compromise, 
exit is nevertheless a crucial liberal value, as we discuss below. Because of 
the role exit. plays in securing a free society, our theory of a liberal 
commons cannot just adopt the findings of political scientists like Taylor 
and Ostrom, although we will, to be sure, make extensive use of their work. 
Rather, we must show that ownership and management of commons 
resources is not doomed to tragedy as the neoclassical economists might 
suggest, nor are its successes limited to illiberal environments as the 
political theorists might imply. 
III. A THEORY OF THE LIBERAL COMMONS 
We must show that a liberal commons offers something people want, 
that existing legal regimes can be modified in realistic ways that would get 
us there, and that the resulting commons ownership institutions can be, at 
the same time, both liberal and prosperous. The first Section of this Part 
explores the goals that a liberal commons must achieve: preserving exit 
while promoting the economic and social gains from cooperation. While 
these goals may appear to conflict, law can mediate them, but only if law is 
understood to operate as a set of background norms, a safety net that can 
catalyze trust in daily interactions. No individual legal rule matters so much 
as the cumulative effect of law that can help generate social expectations 
supportive of trust and cooperation. The second Section sets out the core of 
our theory, the three spheres of action that any legal regime must address 
and the rules it should adopt to achieve liberal commons goals. These three 
features-the sphere of individual dominion, the sphere of democratic self-
63. See McKean, supra note 6, at 261-62. 
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governance, and the sphere of cooperation-enhancing exit-constitute what 
we call the general form of the liberal commons. 
A. Identifying the Goals 
We focus here on what may be called" meso" or mid-level goals, those 
that are intrinsic to the general liberal commons form and that are amenable 
to law reform. Application of the liberal commons form to any particular 
institution, such as marital property, condominium associations, or close 
corporations, would require considering two other levels of normative 
goals. First, there may be "micro" nuanced values that inhere in the 
particular institution being considered for reform in a liberal commons 
direction. For example, any application of our theory to marital property 
must account for deep cultural concerns with the ultimate collective goods 
of marriage, such as intimacy, caring and commitment, and self-
identification.64 Adapting the general liberal commons form to the marital 
context may require some fine-tuning that would allow the accommodation 
of these values. Other liberal commons settings, like condominium 
associations and close corporations, may require responding to widely held 
values particular to these settings. Second, there may be "macro" social 
commitments that transcend the liberal commons form but necessarily 
inform analysis of all such institutions. For example, concern for 
nonsubordination of women and nonexclusion of minorities will necessarily 
refine analyses across a wide range of institutions, including marital 
property and common interest communities.65 These macro values may be 
so widely shared and deeply held as to justify their imposition in a 
particular liberal commons form even when they differ from or perhaps 
conflict with the micro values of that form. Considered together, these three 
levels of values-micro, meso, and macro-can help frame existing 
institutions for commons resource management in their best light, and, by 
doing so, point toward normatively attractive reforms.66 In this Section, we 
focus only on meso goals, those that attach to the general form of the liberal 
commons. 
1. Preserving Exit 
a. Why Exit Matters 
Exit is a bedrock liberal value, an essential element of a liberal 
commons, and a core term of art in political and legal theory. First defined 
64. Carolyn Frantz and Hanoch Dagan are exploring these issues in an anicle currently in 
progress. 
65. Michael Heller and Rick Hills will be considering the common interest community case in 
an upcoming anicle. 
66. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 52-53 (developing such an interpretive method). 
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by Albert Hirschman,67 exit means "voluntarily leaving the effective 
jurisdiction of the group," 68 whether that group is a nation, firm, or other 
type of organization. Exit stands for the right to withdraw or refuse to 
engage: the ability to dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with 
other persons.69 At a minimum, exit serves a protective function: "If the 
group harms the interests of the member as the member sees them, then 
leaving is a form of a self-defense." 70 In addition to its intrinsic importance, 
the possibility of exit is instrumentally important. The threat of exit is often 
one of the prominent mechanisms for disciplining social organizations and 
optimizing the use of the commons resource:71 "The possibility of exit may 
itself make the group responsive to the interests of its members," 72 and 
conversely help make members become better cooperators within the 
group.13 
The multiple functions of exit in the commons resource context matter 
to liberals because they "enhance the capacity for a self-directed life, 
including the capacity to form, revise, and pursue our ends." 74 Generally, 
liberals are committed to "open boundaries," that is, to the idea that people 
should be able to leave the groups with which they choose to associate (and 
sometimes they should also be able to abandon even their own current 
identities).7-5 In some accounts, liberalism may even be defined as a theory 
that adopts, justifies, and applies a strong commitment to geographical, 
social, familial, and political mobility-all in the name of promoting the 
individual freedom necessary to secure one's own personal happiness.76 No 
doubt, a moderate restraint on exit-either an exit tax or departure delay, 
for example-need not be considered offensive to liberalism. Indeed, 
consistent with liberal convictions, such soft constraints may well be 
necessary to ensure that the decision to leave is informed (not hasty and 
ignorant) and sincere (not opportunistic).77 But a regime that makes exit 
impractical through outright prohibitions or via rules that de facto prohibit 
exit (including rules that impose prohibitive exit costs) or that unreasonably 
67. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LoY AL TY (1970). 
68. Leslie Green. Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL llIBORY 165. 171 (1998) (emphasis omitted); see also 
id. at 177 (stating that "the core right of exit" is "the claim right that others not prevent one from 
leaving the jurisdiction of the group"). 
69. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1400-09 (2d ed. 1988) 
(describing the "dual character of associational rights," which include both the right to associate 
oneself with certain persons and the right to dissociate oneself from certain persons). See generally 
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 67, at 19-20 (suggesting the usefulness of economic concepts such as exit to 
political scientists, and the usefulness of political mechanisms such as voice to economists). 
70. Green, supra note 68, at 171. 
71. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 67, at 22-25. 
72. Green, supra note 68, at 171. 
73. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 6-16 (1959) (discussing the concept of 
negative liberty and its consequences for individual behavior). 
74. Green, supra note 68, at 176. 
75. See Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 11-12, 
15-16 (1990). 
76. Id. at 21. 
77. We develop this point in Subsection ill.B.3 infra. 
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delay exit, is incompatible with the most fundamental liberal tenets.78 Exit 
restraints that just treat individuals instrumentally cannot be legitimate 
features of a liberal commons. 
The critical virtues that exit enhances help to explain its status 
throughout liberal legal regimes.79 For example, property law is generally 
suspicious of restraints on alienation, even consensual restraints that limit 
mobility respecting any particular resource. 80 Often, statutes prohibit and 
courts invalidate outright restraints on alienability; when faced with more 
moderate restraints, courts may impose time limits or otherwise protect an 
individual's right to exit.81 People generally do not perceive interference 
with restrictions on alienability to be an unwarranted intrusion into freedom 
of contract. Rather, the interference protects against agreements that 
undermine a key purpose of contractual freedom, that is, securing 
individual autonomy.82 
To be sure, liberalism is also committed to favoring contractual 
freedom to craft whatever restraints by which people agree to abide. But 
one can and should distinguish ordinary contracts-where liberal values do 
not reject strong lock-ins-from property arrangements that encompass 
much more of an individual's resources and social life. Regarding these 
latter arrangements, the initial election of an illiberal exit rule cannot cut off 
the liberal commitment to choice. Limiting people's ability to waive their 
exit rights, in this context, is based only in part on a response to rationality 
deficiencies, such as excessive optimism and lack of foresight. These limits 
are also, and perhaps even primarily, premised on the commitment to a 
conception of individual liberty that puts a high value on people's ability to 
"reinvent themselves." 
78. See Mark D. Rosen, The Outer limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential 
Associations, Municipalities, aruJ Indinn Country: A liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1099-
101, 1126-27 (1998). 
79. Consider an example from outside the liberal commons context: Despite the tide of 
fundamentalism in some parts of the world, certain rights of exit-such as the right to emigrate 
from one's homeland-are now considered basic human rights, which are, as such, inalienable 
and nonwaiveable. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, G.A. Res. 217 (IIl)(A), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
80. Admittedly, this is not the only justification for these inalienabilities. Another important 
justification comes from efficiency. See Heller, supra note 56, at 1199-201 (discussing the role of 
restrictions on restraint on alienability); see also Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089, 1111-15 (1972) (discussing the inefficiency of restraints on alienation but also suggesting 
"instances, perhaps many, in which economic efficiency is more closely approximated by such 
limitations"); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970, 971-72 
(1985) (setting out the efficiency argument for alienation and arguing against restraints on 
alienation to achieve distributional goals); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of 
Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 932 (1985) (accepting that "unencumbered market 
trades are desirable unless we can locate a valid reason for their restriction," while broadening the 
range of efficient restrictions on alienability from the Calabresi and Melamed model). 
81. See generally Heller, supra note 56, at 1199 n.174 (enumerating objections to restraints on 
alienation). 
82. On contractual freedom and individual autonomy, see CHARLES FRIED, CON1RACT AS 
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 7-17 (1981 ). 
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We can safely sidestep ongoing disputes among liberal theorists 
regarding the precise role of exit, such as whether exit is, by itself, a 
sufficient condition to preserve individual autonomy.s3 For our purposes, 
we assert only the modest, and we think uncontroversial, proposition that 
some strong version of exit is a fundamental, core right in any theory worth 
labeling as liberal.s4 As we see it, exit enables individuals to determine their 
own group associations and to remain in the groups they choose out of their 
free choice only. In short, the possibility of exit allows individuals the 
mobility that is a prerequisite for liberty. 
b. ls Entry Like Exit? 
Is free entry the mirror image of free exit, and as such also a core 
element of the liberal commons? Only to a limited extent. We believe that 
liberals should not be concerned with every limitation on entry. Insofar as 
liberals are committed to pluralism and diversity85 and recognize the 
significance of culture and community to personal identity,s6 we must be 
careful not to condemn or criticize every homogeneous community and 
every exclusionary practice.87 Moreover, insofar as liberals are concerned 
with groups that tolerate cross-cutting affiliations (and thus only partially 
cover their members' associational worlds), a liberal commitment to 
pluralism requires a multiplicity of groups, which in turn calls for allowing 
groups autonomously to determine their own, divergent membership 
requirements.ss As Michael Walzer puts it, "we need to sustain and enhance 
associational ties, even if these ties connect some of us to some others and 
not everyone to everyone else." 89 
83. Compare Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF 
MINORITY CULTURES 228, 238 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) (highlighting the liberal view of cultural 
communities as voluntary associations), with Green, supra note 68 (arguing that exit is not sufficient 
to secure individual autonomy in groups). 
84. Recall also that, even aside from liberal theory, exit is a value with many virtues, 
including, but not limited to, serving as a disciplinary limit on organizations. 
85. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF 
HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS I (Henry Hardy ed., 1991); JOHN KEKES, THE 
MORALITY OF PLURALISM ( 1993); JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM ( 1986). 
86. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, ElHICS IN lHE PUBLIC DOMAIN: EsSAYS IN lHE MORALITY OF LAW 
AND PoLITICS 155-74 (1994); Chaim Gans, The Liberal Foundations of Cultural Nationalism, 30 
CAN. J. PHIL. 441 (2000); Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right 
to Culture, 61 Soc. REs. 491 (1994); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in 
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLmcs OF RECOGNmON 25, 40-41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1994). 
87. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the 
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1592-614 
(1997) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTJDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 
(1996)). 
88. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Government (Sept. 25, 
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). 
89. WALZER, supra note 9, at 105. 
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Accepting the asymmetry between exit and entry is important for our 
theory of the liberal commons. Although we believe, with Ostrom, that 
group homogeneity is not a sufficient or ex ante necessary condition for 
commons success, nevertheless, we also know that well-functioning 
commons regimes give paramount concern to nurturing shared values and 
excluding bad cooperators.90 Tolerance towards limitations on entry can 
help preserve the integrity and character (in terms of interests or values) of 
the commons' existing members, and thus be instrumental to the success of 
liberal commons regimes.91 
Although a liberal theory does not require free entry, we think that there 
are two extreme types of entry limitations so troublesome that a regime 
allowing either cannot reasonably be said to embody the constellation of 
values generally considered to constitute liberalism. First, there are cases in 
which a limitation on entry so sweepingly restricts alienability that it is 
practically tantamount to a substantial limitation on exit.92 In these cases, 
the liberal commitment to free exit, rather than the more tempered 
commitment to free entry, condemns the limitation. Second, some 
exclusionary practices and criteria-for example, a systematic exclusion by 
communities of a minority group that is based on prejudice respecting 
issues such as race, ethnicity, or religion-may well infringe upon 
fundamental liberal values of equal concern and respect.93 Delineating the 
scope of such prohibited classifications, as well as of any surrogates of such 
classifications that should be likewise prohibited, is an important and 
complex task, but well outside the scope of our project.94 For our purposes 
here, it is enough to state that a liberal commons must always be careful not 
to cross the fine line between permitted homogeneity of purpose and 
prohibited discriminatory exclusion.95 
90. See supra Section II.C (discussing conditions for success on the commons). 
91. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and 
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. l, 50-53 (1989); Clayton P. Gillette, Couns, Covenants, and 
Communities, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (1994) (arguing that, within limits, a polity should 
approve of the way residential associations "allow individuals with common preferences to gravitate 
to a common location where they can pursue their conception of the good life"). 
92. For an example of such a limitation, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics 
as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 671-74 (1998) 
which describes how the Democrat-dominated Hawaiian government's prohibition on crossover 
voting in election primaries, prohibition on write-in votes, and prevention of "party-raiding" 
constitute significant barriers to entry into political competition and create prohibitive costs for 
exiting the party. 
93. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l (1948) (holding that state-court enforcement of a 
racially restrictive housing covenant violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Alexander, supra note 91, at 38, 54-55. 
94. Developing this point are Gillette, supra note 91, at 1397-99; and Hills, supra note 87, at 
1592-614. See also Alexander, supra note 91, at 55-61 (advocating a legal regime of open-ended 
standards for governing the question of the limits of group autonomy, in order to "create 
opportunities for those inside and those outside to engage each other in dialogue"). See generally 
Rosen, supra note 78 (suggesting the outer limits of community self-governance that may be entailed 
by JOHN RAWLS, PoLmCALLIBERALISM (1993)). 
95. Should there also be a right to eject a member who was mistakenly accepted or to protect 
against a member's later change of heart? In most cases, it seems to us that such a right would do 
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2. Promoting Cooperation 
a. Maximizing Economic Gains 
While one goal of a liberal commons is to preserve the virtues that 
come from protecting exit, the other goal is to achieve the economic and 
social gains possible from cooperation. On the economic side, several types 
of efficiency gains may be available from joint management and pooling of 
resources in a commons, for example, economies of scale and risk-
spreading.96 The familiar economic approach acknowledges that, in 
evaluating " whether the resources are common pool or amenable to 
privatization, particular natural resource configurations, technological 
constraints, and transactions costs may make common property a superior 
solution to private property." 97 Thus, with landownership, larger parcels 
may sometimes be preferred over smaller ones: In the agricultural context, 
larger parcels may economize on fencing and cultivation costs (especially 
where specialized equipment is available);98 in urban contexts, larger 
parcels may allow construction of more valuable projects. In addition, 
where a number of people own land together, they may be able to divide the 
risks of ownership. Because most people are risk-averse, risk-spreading 
through common ownership may be efficiency-enhancing, as for example 
with land holdings that represent a large and otherwise undiversifiable part 
of individual wealth . 
. b. Recognizing Social Value 
Alongside potential efficiency gains, people could prefer cooperation 
simply to receive the benefits of working together, of taking part in a 
successful collective enterprise.99 Cooperation, in other words, is a good, in 
more harm than good: A group right to eject can easily be abused by the majority as an instrument 
for exploitation or retaliation for nonconformism. Granting such a power to the majority may 
upset the delicate balance between majority jurisdiction and the minority protection discussed 
below in Subsection III.B.2. To be sure, we do not want to downplay the harm a bad cooperator or 
a disgruntled commoner can inflict on a liberal commons. To some extent, this harm can be 
mitigated if the other commoners have already developed a thick fabric of cooperative social 
norms with corresponding social sanctions for violations. But we concede that this is no full cure. 
This difficulty is one good reason for adopting the relatively permissive approach to group-entry 
limitations that we suggest in the text above. 
96. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1332-44. 
97. STEVENSON, supra note 21, at 70. 
98. See ABHJJITV. BANERJEE, LAND REFORMS:"PROSPECTS AND STRATEGIES 2 (Mass. Inst. of 
Tech. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 99-24, 1999) (citing studies that suggest how large parcels 
may economize on production costs). 
99. See JON ELsTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 187 (1989). Jon. 
Eisler argues that successful collective action is produoed by a "mix of motivations-selfish and 
normative, rational and irrational .... Motivations that taken separately would not get collective 
action off the ground may interact, snowball and build upon each other so that the whole exceeds the 
sum of its parts." Id. Carol Rose has helpfully suggested to us that our emphasis on the social value 
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and of itself, in addition to its importance in facilitating economic success. 
People value interpersonal relationships-they form associations and take 
part in collective enterprises-not only for instrumental reasons as a means 
to some independently specified end: "We human beings are social 
creatures, and creatures with values. Among the things that we value are 
our relations with each other." 100 
Our relationships with spouses, children, friends, neighbors, co-
workers, and other types of potential commoners have intrinsic value that 
we often strive to promote. 101 Participants in a group with a joint 
commitment may perceive themselves as members of a "plural subject." 102 
This perception stimulates a sense of unity, even of intimacy or closeness, 
that human beings tend to find gratifying. 103 Liberal commons settings are 
particularly suitable for furthering these types of social relationships104 
because certain tasks, like the common management of a given resource, 
provide an opportunity to enrich and solidify the interpersonal capital that 
grows from cooperation, support, trust, and mutual responsibility .105 Indeed, 
of cooperation can be reframed in terms of the synergistic (rather than merely aggregative) benefits 
of cooperation. 
100. Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 189, 200 
(1997). In a similar vein, Walzer notes, "Individuals are stronger, more confident, more savvy, when 
they are participants in a common life, when they are responsible to and for other people." WALZER, 
supra note 9, at 104. 
101. See, e.g., AleKander, supra note 91, at 26, 41-42 (pointing to the intrinsic good of the 
experience of belonging that is based on a shared good or a shared resource); Ellickson, supra note 
19, at 1345, 1395 (noting that companionship and the solidification of "mutual-aid relationships" are 
potential benefits of living in a multimember household, and pointing out the satisfaction of "living 
in a social environment that is consistent with [one's] ideology"); Henry Hansmann, When Does 
Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetennination, and Economic Democracy, 99 
YALE L.J. 1749, 1769-70 (1990) (concluding that worker ownership may bring noneconomic 
benefits: the satisfaction of engaging in a communal activity; the elimination of the potential conflict 
of interest between workers and owners; the psychological benefit of control over resources; and 
training for democratic participation that may benefit society generally as well as the workers 
themselves); Simon, supra note 6, at 1364 (praising cooperative housing as "creat[ing] a fairly 
strong form of interdependence, as well a~ opportunities for collective action"). 
102. MARGARET GILBERT, LIVING TOGETHER: RATIONALITY, SOCIALITY, AND OBLIGATION 
2, 8 (1996). For a succinct summary of the literature on collective agency, see Elizabeth S. 
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1503, 1514-20 (2000). 
103. See GILBERT, supra note 102, at 221. 
104. Cf. PENNER, supra note 48, at 181 (arguing that exclusive use-the core feature of 
private property-suits an impersonal social situation). 
105. Cf. GILBERT, supra note 102, at 222-23 (noting that marriage may produce an intensive, 
long-term fusion, ranging over an ever-increasing number of projects, and that it is exactly this 
intensity and continuity of intensity that stimulates unity, closeness, and mutual trust); Robert 
McC. Netting, What Alpine Peasants Have in Common: Observations on Communal Tenure in a 
Swiss Village, 4 HUM. ECOLCXW 135, 143 n.13 (1976). Netting notes that while most vineyards 
and grain fields in the Swiss village ofTorbel were individually owned, the community as a whole 
owned a vineyard, a grain field, a church, and a dwelling where the priest lived. These resources 
were used to support the priest, as well as to compensate the fire brigade and others who provided 
special services for the community. Netting links the existence of this communal property to 
community cohesion: "In these cases, communal rights to land and buildings that would 
otherwise be private contribute directly to social solidarity and village integrity. In each instance, 
the token communal resources are used to support social services and village-wide celebrations 
that promote cooperation and emphasize unity." Netting, supra, at 143 n.13. 
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in certain settings, such as in some religious and cultural communities, the 
commons resource may even form the center of a way of life that 
profoundly affects the commoners' self-identity.106 
c. Reconciling Economic and Social Values 
In many liberal commons contexts, economic gains and social values 
tend to reinforce one another. Interpersonal capital facilitates trust, which, 
in turn, gives rise to economic success. And economic success tends to 
strengthen trust and mutual responsibility. But we can imagine contexts in 
which the imperatives of economic success and social cohesion conflict. 
Any liberal commons must pay some attention to both fronts. Both are 
intrinsically valuable and thus neither should be abandoned. Furthermore, 
either total economic failure or the collapse of social cohesion will 
effectively end cooperative resource management and likely yield a tragic 
outcome. 
But beyond this modest imperative, we do not attempt to come up with 
any general formula for solving such conflicts. It would be incredible to 
suggest that the relative importance of economic success and of social 
cohesion is constant over the vast realms of life-from families to close 
corporations-in which liberal commons regimes may be established. 
Rather, we believe that setting the balance between these two happy 
outcomes of cooperation-to the extent that they are in conflict-must be 
context-dependent; that is, the balance should be informed by the applicable 
micro and macro values. There are realms of life in which the commoners' 
economic success is likely to play a rather major role (a close corporation 
may be an example) and there are others (say, the family) in which a 
significant degree of inefficiency may be a tolerable price for securing the 
social goods of cooperation. 
3. Do Exit and Cooperation Conflict? 
The two goals of the liberal commons-preserving autonomy through 
exit and achieving economic and social gains through cooperation-may 
work at cross purposes. This simple, troubling observation lies at the core 
of the "tragedy of the commons" metaphor. The ownership and 
management of commons resources may exemplify the most familiar of all 
106. See, e.g., ANDREW GRAY, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: SELF-
DETERMINA TION IN AN AMAzoNIAN COMMUNITY 109-11 (1997) (describing the close identification 
of land and other resources with individuals and groups among the Arakrnbut of the southeastern 
Peruvian rainforest); Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property 
in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 194 (2000) ("The group product in 
the indigenous society is the medium through which all tribal members, living. dead and unborn. 
speak their voice and become a part of the tribal way."); Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic 
Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 19-20 (1992) (claiming that for some tribes and communities, land forms 
the center of a present way of life and can be of religious and cultural significance). 
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collective action problems,107 one often formalized as a multiperson 
prisoner's dilemma with an incentive structure facilitating noncooperative 
behavior and generating tragic outcomes. 108 If the story stopped there, it 
would be rather disappointing because there would be no way people could 
reach the economic and social gains potentially available from pooling 
resources in a commons. 
However, where people have repeat dealings-typically the case with 
relationships among commoners--cooperation does prove possible, even 
likely. As Robert Axelrod famously demonstrated with his tit-for-tat 
strategy, people may cooperate even with prisoner's dilemma incentives 
(and without side communication) once their interactions are turned into an 
indefinite game. Axelrod defines his strategy to require "avoidance of 
unnecessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player does, 
provocability in the face of an uncalled for defection by the other, 
forgiveness after responding to a provocation, and clarity of behavior so 
that the other player can adapt to your pattern of action." 109 As Axelrod 
explains, this happy result "requires that the players have a large enough 
chance of meeting again and that they do not discount the significance of 
their next meeting too greatly." 110 The ability to remember and retaliate 
makes noncooperative moves individually counterproductive, and thus may 
induce self-interested cooperation, even in a comrnons.111 
But this happy scenario may, in turn, pose a stumbling block for our 
theory. Previous commentators noted that, for cooperative results to 
emerge, the game must repeat indefinitely .112 A repeated interaction with a 
finite ending may still yield tragedy, because each participant knows that 
the last move will resemble a one-shot prisoner's dilemma, in which 
defection is the dominant strategy. Knowing that others will defect on their 
last move creates a domino effect through earlier interactions, so that 
defection becomes the dominant strategy for everyone from the outset. 113 
107. "Collective action" is a generic term describing the difficulty faced by a group of self-
interested individuals where the promotion of their self-interest requires cooperation. Even if they 
all agree on both their collective purpose and the best means to promote this purpose, they will 
still face difficulties in achieving it, since for each and every one of them, the individual interest 
supersedes their share of the collective good. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PuBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 7-8, 10-11, 16, 21, 51, 60-61 (1971). 
108. E.g., OSTROM, supra note 6, at 3-5; STEVENSON, supra note 21, at 20-27. 
109. ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 20 (1984). 
110. Id. at 174. 
111. Id. at 126-32; see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 145-50, 164-67 (1982) 
("[P]layers may rationally cooperate in iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas."). 
112. E.g., ANTHONY DE JASA Y, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE PuBLIC 
GooDS PROBLEM 63-66 (1989) (noting that the individual-maximization calculus under which it 
works even better not to take advantage of others arises when there are continuing interactions with 
the same players); Rose, supra note 45, at 51 n.49 (noting that the possibility of retaliation preserves 
a cooperative regime on a basis of self-interest, but also pointing out difficulties with this theory). 
113. See, e.g., R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-102 (1957). 
For certain (partial) solutions, see HARDIN, supra note 111, at 173-87, 211-13, suggesting ways in 
which varied, but overlapping, interactions can provide opportunities for meaningful sanctions, the 
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Consider how a strong right of exit affects the likelihood of an efficient 
commons, at least within the artificial world of game theory (assuming, for 
the moment, voracious, unsocialized commoners). 114 Strong exit allows 
each commoner an unwaiveable right to leave the commons at any moment. 
But each commoner also knows that others can leave at any moment, 
raising a serious concern for those who want to stay put. The stay-putters 
worry what may happen between the moment the foot-out-the-door folks 
decide to leave and the moment they actually exit. In the interim, the stay-
putters may continue to cooperate, but the foot-out-the-door folks are now 
playing a transitory and short-lived game. The stay-putters may worry that, 
during the interim period, which can happen at any time, the foot-out-the-
door folks will take advantage of them, either by overexploiting or 
underinvesting in the commons resource. 
Still, in many contexts, unilateral uncertainty regarding when others 
might leave need not frustrate cooperation.115 Vigilant commoners can react 
to noncooperative moves by retaliating promptly, thus limiting the risk of 
exploitation and making cooperation stable. However, two features of long-
term cooperation in managing commons resources make vigilant retaliation 
an unsatisfying response for our purposes. First, the benefits to commoners 
can vary substantially over time. Therefore, each potential stay-putter may 
suspect that the others (the potential foot-out-the-door folks) will defect 
precisely when they can realize particularly high benefits from the 
commons resource. If defection at a given moment proves more 
advantageous than continuous cooperation, then the possibility of 
retaliating later may not be able to mitigate the harm that foot-out-the-door 
folks can inflict with well-timed defections. Not wanting to be suckers, 
stay-putters may behave as if they too are foot-out-the-door folks. 116 
There is a second, more prosaic reason why strong exit threatens 
commons prosperity. Commoners may have independent or exogenous 
reasons to exit; they may leave because of familial, professional, or other 
reasons that have nothing to do with timing advantageous defection. But 
after they decide to leave for such reasons, the erstwhile stay-putters may 
be tempted to behave like foot-out-the-door folks in timing their intended 
exit: Once they know that they will soon depart, their incentive to cooperate 
knowledge necessary to cooperate, and a rough simulation of an infinitely iterated prisoner's 
dilemma game. 
114. In the real world, commoners are not usually voracious and unsocialized. Indeed, the 
opposite seems true. But the always real possibility of abuse suggests the role of legal protection: 
It seems a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to sustain trust and cooperation in a liberal 
commons setting. Our simple game theory mode of analysis helps puzzle through these 
relationships. 
115. For instance, in the antitrust context, collusive agreements can be stable. See RICHARD 
A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER 
MATERIALS 336-38 (2d ed. 1981) (identifying conditions conducive to collusion). 
I 16. Players in long but transitory games, that is, where all parties know the end point, may 
be less prone to defecting because the symmetry of information somewhat eases the fear of 
exploitation. HARDIN, supra note 111, at 145-50. 
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is greatly diminished.1 17 And all the other commoners face again the same 
troubling question: Why restrain yourself now if the other commone.rs may 
choose their moment to take the most and run? Again, even prompt 
retaliation may not solve the challenge that strong rights of exit pose to 
efficient use of a commons because retaliation cannot recoup all of the 
losses imposed by the foot-out-the-door folks. 
A theory of a liberal commons requires two elements: strong (but not 
unlimited) exit and the possibility of realizing economic and social gains 
from shared use of scarce resources. But simple game theory reasoning 
helps formalize the familiar intuition that these elements may work at cross-
purposes. The structure of interactions in a commons seems to offer only 
partial solutions to the threat posed by exit. If so, then an efficient and 
liberal commons may not be a realistic possibility. How can law resolve the 
seeming impasse? 
4. Putting Law in Its Place 
a. Law as a Safety Net That Catalyzes Trust 
Consider for a moment the seeming paradox that an efficient liberal 
regime of private property is itself, oddly, a type of commons held together 
by virtue of the law's facilitation. 118 By constraining individual 
opportunism, law proves effective as one mode of social organization that 
helps overcome collective action problems inherent in creating and 
maintaining private property. Using law to build a liberal commons is not 
so different. 
To start, we join with commons property scholars who have shown so 
persuasively how political and social institutions can affect the costs and 
benefits facing commons owners in their attempts to organize themselves.119 
They show how "generalized institutional-choice and conflict-resolution" 
mechanisms together with "substantial local autonomy" can facilitate and 
sustain commons property regimes. 120 After getting to this point, however, 
117. Notice the difference between the two reasons that exit threatens successful commons 
property. The first reason requires a unique payoff structure in which the variations between gains 
at different times are so great that defection destabilizes cooperation. The second applies more 
broadly. If exit at a time between now and a given moment in the future is imposed (due to those 
external reasons), the domino effect applies, and the party who is about to leave is likely to exploit 
her superior information. 
118. See Rose, supra note 45, at 51; see also EIRIK G. FuRUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, 
INSTITUTIONS AND EcONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
EcONOMICS 76 (l 997) (" [T)he existence of trust, reinforced with institutional safeguards, can 
lead to the convention of private property and its social protection."); TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 
44-48 (characterizing the features of law that provide security of property as a public good); Krier, 
supra note 45, at 333 (observing the dependence of a private property regime on public regulation). 
119. See OSlROM, supra note 6, at 190, 212. 
120. Id. at 212. 
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the ex1stmg literature invariably compromises exit. 121 Because we are 
committed, as we believe most people in our polity are, to the fundamental 
right of exit, our path leads instead through the thicket of law toward a 
theory of a liberal commons. Law can serve two functions: to provide the 
infrastructure of liberal commons institutions and to supply anti-
opportunistic devices that reassure prospective commoners that they will 
not be abused for cooperating. By adopting a straightforward collection of 
substantive and procedural rules, liberal commons forms can encourage 
prosperity and cooperation without sacrificing exit. 
Law should be understood to work as a set of background rules, always 
in operation, but seldom overtly manifest in the daily life of commons 
resource management. 122 Formal law is often not powerful enough, by 
itself, to establish directly the trust, cooperation, and mutual reliance that 
any successful commons requires for the day-to-day routines of self-
govemance. Commoners generally will not deploy law on a regular basis 
with each other, both because it would be costly and because people often 
perceive recourse to law as unnecessary, unneighborly, or even hostile in 
ongoing relationships of trust and cooperation.123 The routine operation of a 
commons resource and the day-to-day cooperation among the commoners 
are directly governed usually through informal, social interactions-
perhaps law-like in their own right-but not by formal legal rules.124 Social 
norms and other modes of social organization and structure, not formal law, 
govern most daily interactions. 
With that caveat, well-designed background legal rules are nevertheless 
crucial for the success of any liberal commons. As we discussed above, the 
right of exit poses a fundamental challenge to commons success: For many 
resources, the unilateral right to leave may invite opportunistic behavior 
and cause people to be on their guard, distrustful, and overly quick to 
retaliate. The background rules we propose can temper these instincts 
primarily by creating a formal "safety net" that enables commoners, 
without taking prohibitive individual risks, to gain the benefits that flow 
from trusting one another. The simple existence of well-crafted background 
rules, rather than their daily invocation, facilitates commoners' efforts to 
establish and maintain liberal commons property. 
121. See sources discussed supra Section Il.C. 
122. The background trust-building role we envision for law, as stated in the text, can only be 
postulated here. It is quite another project to address the undertheorized understanding of the way 
Jaw generally (and not only the Jaw regarding common ownership) affects people's everyday lives 
and constrains or enables their decisionmaking. 
123. E.g., ELIZABE1H ANDERSON, VALUE IN E1HICS AND EcONOM!CS 157 (1993); ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WI1HOUT LA w: How NEIGHBORS SEITLE DISPUTES 60-64, 69' 76, 27 4 ( 1991 ); 
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1285-
87, 1294-95 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law (Sept. 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). 
124. See generally Symposium, l.Llw, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) 
(including articles describing a range of contexts in which such norms form and operate). 
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While commoners are unlikely to bother learning the rules of (low-
visibility) law, their ignorance of the law does not diminish its modest but 
important role. The myriad details of the law do not matter individually, but 
jointly they produce practices and experiences that in turn generate social 
expectations. For law to affect behavior, we do not assume widespread 
knowledge of any doctrinal detail, only that people generally believe that if 
things turn ugly, the law will serve as one form of social organization that 
protects them against extreme abuse and exploitation. 
More precisely, the constellation of background rules that should 
govern a liberal commons must minimize incentives to abuse the 
interpersonal trust and cooperation necessary for success. Thus, liberal 
commons property forms can enable individuals who appreciate the 
potential economic or social benefits of common management of scarce 
resources safely to enter into relationships of mutual reliance that they may 
otherwise perceive as too risky. In an ill).perfect world, where we can never 
absolutely trust one another, background legal rules can function as an 
effective social organizational form that reinforces each commoner's trust 
in others and willingness to cooperate without focusing on the grave 
vulnerability that such trust can engender. 125 By generating the so-called 
social capital of shared norms, including norms of self-control, trust reduces 
the costs of monitoring and sanctioning activities.126 
Background law that catalyzes trust is, for us, one essential alternative 
to restrictions on exit that can also make commons ownership work 
effectively. Some initial measure of trust-generated from the commoners' 
self-interest, associational ties, or desire to engage, as the case may be-is a 
precondition for a liberal commons. But building trust is also an outcome. 
Just as trust secures success, so does success reinforce trust-a virtuous 
circle in which trust, as Philip Pettit claims, "builds on trust" and may 
"grow with use." 127 
I 25. HARDIN, supra note l I I, at 186 (" [T]he possibility of sanction is valuable for letting the 
well-intentioned, who do not n:quire sanctions, risk being cooperative on the secure knowledge that 
those with whom they come to interact are similarly well-intentioned."); H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (1961); JEREMY WALDRON, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Needfor 
Rights, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 370, 373-74, 376, 385, 387 (1993); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a 
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1765, 1793 (1996) ("[T]he transactor may find it desirable to include terms in lhe contract lhat an: 
the best tenns if the other transactor turns out to be untrustworthy, while making extralegal 
commitments ... that will govern the relationship if the other party turns out to be trustworthy."); 
Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 535, 537-38, 540-41, 546, 550 
(1995) (discussing bases for, and betrayals of, "semi-rational" or "doubting" trust). 
126. See OSTROM, supra note 6, at 36. 
127. Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 202, 209-10 (1995). Kahan 
elaborates: 
[The] behaviorally realistic model suggests the importance of promoting trust. Individuals 
who have faith in the willingness of others to contribute their fair share will voluntarily 
respond in kind. Spontaneous cooperation of this sort, moreover, breeds even more of the 
same, as individuals observe others contributing to public goods and are moved to 
reciprocate. 
Kahan, supra note 123, at 2. 
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b. The Penalty Default Alternative 
Consider for a moment one possible objection to using law as a safety 
net and as a catalyst: Facilitative default rules could be, in the long run, 
counterproductive.128 According to this view, by making cooperation 
relatively risk-free, facilitative default rules could induce cooperators into 
making suboptimal investments in screening other potential cooperators and 
in learning how to cooperate better among themselves. Restated, the law 
should not promote ownership and management of commons resources 
unless the commoners could agree up front on their governance structure, 
without the assistance of legal mediation. If the commoners could not agree 
on initial terms, it is unlikely they could agree on much else, and therefore 
it would be better from an ex ante perspective if potential cooperators did 
not invest in a cooperative scheme that would be doomed to fail, in any 
event.129 This objection is pertinent for us because we argue that liberal 
commons success must rely primarily on the parties' ability to cooperate 
without the daily summons of legal rules. If this claim is right, then penalty 
default rules-rules that make trust and reliance risky absent an explicit ex 
ante agreement regarding the terms of_ cooperation-would be better than 
the facilitative regime we advocate. 130 
But insofar as commons resource ownership is concerned, the penalty 
default objection is probably wrong, and the contextual tradeoff between 
facilitating cooperation and encouraging caution leads us to prefer the 
facilitative regime. To see why, consider how these two competing regimes 
affect the behavior of ordinary, "mid-level" cooperators, the overwhelming 
majority of whom must be the main target of a legal regime that purports to 
encourage liberal commons property.131 Given that learning to cooperate 
better is itself a (second-order) collective good for the commoners, 132 it is 
difficult to see how a regime of penalty default rules would ever generate 
happy outcomes; rather, such rules would exacerbate the downward cycle 
128. We are grateful to our colleague Jim Krier for challenging us on this front and helping 
us respond to this challenge. 
129. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and liability Rules: The 
Cathedral in Another light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 464, 478 (1995); see also Smith, supra note 35, 
at 167 (making a similar claim with respect to scattered and semi commons property). 
130. On penalty default rules, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989), which argues that 
"penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want-in order to encourage 
the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties." 
131. A regime that encourages ownership and management of commons resources must focus 
it~ effects mainly on mid-level cooperators, because especially good cooperators may well 
succeed in effectively working together irrespective of the legal regime, and uniquely bad 
cooperators would fail in any event. (Furthermore, to the extent that for mid-level cooperators 
cooperation is itself a reward, but for bad cooperators it is not, the latter are unlikely to bid as high 
as the former to join.) The only important prescription regarding bad cooperators is that the law 
should allow-maybe even encourage-the others to exclude them. As the text below explains, 
this exclusion can be achieved without adopting a regime of penalty default rules. 
132. See Krier, supra note 45, at 337-39. 
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of distrust that such rules assume to begin with. On the other hand, contrary 
to the penalty default objection, even a facilitative regime actually does 
not guarantee risk-free cooperation because law is always imperfect and 
must always be invoked by an injured party.133 Thus, the level of 
underinvestment in caution and in self-education under the facilitative 
regime is lower than the penalty default objection assumes and is, in any 
event, outweighed by the benefit of allowing mid-level cooperators to play 
the game at all. 
Perhaps the penalty default argument has more bite when people are 
involuntarily thrown together in a commons, as when inheritance leads to 
co-ownership. In this view, the ex ante expected level of cooperation and 
trust among involuntary commoners is much lower than that of voluntary 
commoners. Therefore, the argument goes, involuntary forms of commons 
should not presumptively include our ambitious apparatus for supporting 
cooperation. Instead, one should expect trust to be absent and cooperation 
to fail, and let failure take its course without intervention. Although we 
agree that involuntary commoners are likely to be less inclined toward 
pursuing cooperative goals, we disagree again with the penalty default 
conclusion. Our point is not to force cooperation but to provide support if 
the commoners want to give cooperation a chance. Preserving exit in such 
cases ensures that our apparatus does not coerce, but facilitates an otherwise 
remote likelihood of cooperation.134 We see no reason to make the choice 
for cooperation more difficult for initially involuntary commoners by 
requiring that they · exit and reenter to gain the benefit of cooperation-
facilitating, trust-building rules. 
In all, we view the role of law as constrained but indispensable. If the 
goals of a liberal commons are to be achieved, law can play no more, but no 
less, than a background role, by serving to catalyze and protect the trust that 
governs day-to-day cooperation. With this understanding of the goals of the 
liberal commons, and the proper role of law, we now turn to the core of our 
theory. 
B. The Three Spheres of a Liberal Commons 
When people trade their precious, if illusory, " sole and despotic 
dominion" for a share in a liberal commons regime, what do they get? First, 
they generally retain the ability to make certain autonomous decisions 
regarding use of the commons resource, the feature we call the "sphere of 
individual dominion." Second, they gain a voice, along with their fellow 
commoners, in collective decisionmaking regarding use of the resource, the 
133. Rose, supra note 125, at 554-56. 
134. Indeed, if failure is likely ex ante, one might understand cooperation, the failure to exit, 
as an affirmative decision to remain (though, admittedly, a contextual decision not to exit does not 
require affirmative action and therefore may be less weighty than an initial decision to enter into 
cooperative resource management). 
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feature we call the "sphere of democratic self-governance." And, third, 
they retain the secure right to exit modified to respect certain community 
concerns if they are dissatisfied or if they are no longer interested in 
cooperating, the feature we call the "sphere of cooperation-enhancing 
exit." These three features-the spheres of individual dominion, 
democratic self-governance, and cooperation-enhancing exit--constitute 
the ideal-typical or general form of any liberal commons. 
It is the necessary confluence of these three features that the liberal 
commons form highlights and the existing private/commons and 
liberty/community binaries hide. No real-world institution incorporates all 
these features; rather, we see approximations, more or less well-adapted to 
the liberal commons goals of promoting the gains from cooperation while 
securing the benefits flowing from strong exit.135 Our discussion here of the 
ideal-typical form and the rules we suggest in each sphere are necessarily 
somewhat abstract because we are trying to unify analysis across a wide 
range of institutions for commons resource management. Refining this ideal 
type, then, becomes an iterative process: Part IV on co-ownership-and our 
future work on family law, common interest communities, etc.-uses the 
liberal commons form to evaluate the law, and that evaluation in turn helps 
refine the liberal commons framework itself. 
1. The Sphere of Individual Dominion 
In one sense or another, all three features of the liberal commons 
elaborated in the following pages are aimed at facilitating trust and 
cooperation (strengthening social values) and generating prosperous use 
(maximizing economic gain). For methodological reasons, we start with the 
most elementary background rules, describing a set of default rules that 
govern the domain of individual action. These rules seek to ensure that 
individual use of the commons resource does not yield tragic outcomes. 
More particularly, these rules counter three forms of inefficient behavior 
regarding commons resources: (1) overuse, (2) underinvestment, and 
(3) wasteful struggles regarding the fruits and revenues that a commons 
may produce. Together, these rules govern the sphere of autonomous 
decisionmaking reserved to each commoner-the actions he or she may 
take without seeking permission from fellow commoners. These rules apply 
only absent a majority decision and are thus intentionally minimalist in 
their scope and aspiration. 
135. Recall that, to be analyzed usefully in the liberal commons framework, an institution 
must be one in which the calculus of utility comprises incommensurable goals, participation is of 
the essence, and the terms for exit matter. See supra text accompanying note 9. These admittance 
criteria circumscribe the problems that any liberal commons form must solve, and hence 
correspond with the three spheres we discuss in the text. The first sphere allows some divergence 
between individual and social use; the second sphere promotes participation; and the third sphere 
protects liberty. 
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We assume that the democratic self-governance institutions of the 
commons, discussed in the next Subsection, generate more refined 
injunctions for beneficial use, and that the default rules we describe here 
apply only to relatively marginal issues, those that do not justify or require 
the invocation of collective decisionmaking. 136 It is nonetheless important to 
appreciate the way even these rules can facilitate trust, cooperation, and 
efficiency. 
a. Policing Overuse 
Let us start with mechanisms that protect against overuse (leaving aside 
nonlegal modes of social organization that may accomplish similar ends). 
We see two complementary approaches to intervention: first, directly 
regulating commoners' behavior through broad but vague default rules, and 
second, indirectly encouraging proper cost internalization by establishing 
tough default rules that give commoners the confidence to trust each other 
in daily interactions. 137 
i. Direct Regulation 
Successful commons property regimes often create detailed, explicit 
regulations restricting and channeling use. To ensure people take 
appropriate care in exploiting the commons environment, such rules 
typically are designed to be easily enforceable, for example, by imposing 
escalating punishments.138 Furthermore, these regulations tend to be 
cautious with regard to current exploitation of the commons resource.139 
136. An important question arises regarding the proper boundary between the sphere of 
individual dominion and the sphere of democratic self-governance. We cannot provide a precise 
answer to this question for all liberal commons settings because the outcome must depend on 
contextual macro and micro values. But in Subsection III.B.2.b infra, we provide our general 
guideline: The liberal commons favors majority rule in a broad realm of management and 
investment (or divestment) decisions so Jong as the majority's decisions are not purely 
redistributive, shifting utility from the minority to the majority. This general prescription signals 
some "bias" in favor of democratic self-governance: In a liberal commons, the sphere of 
individual dominion is residual whereas the sphere of democratic self-governance is dominant. 
Such a bias does not collapse the liberal commons into the communitarian ideals of commons 
property, however, because for the liberal commons, collective governance is democratic and exit 
is preserved. 
137. As an aside, the success of the medieval open-field system seems due, in part, to 
communal regulation of the fields' use according to the two forms we explore in the text below. 
Cf Smith, supra note 35, at 132, 136-37 (terming the open-field system a "semicommons" 
because of how it combines commons and private uses). 
138. OSTROM, supra note 6, at 71-74 (detailing how access to a river for irrigation in villages 
in Valencia was controlled by consistent monitoring by the farmers themselves and by elected 
officials, with a tribunal determining violations and imposing fines); id. at 94-100 (addressing the 
importance of graduated sanctions); McKean, supra note 6, at 256 (describing escalating 
penalties-including exclusion or banishment in extreme cases-in the commons governance 
regimes of certain Japanese villages); id. at 272-75 (describing the need for easily enforceable 
rules). 
139. McKean, supra note 6, at 272-75. 
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Conservative limits on exploitation may impose some current costs, but 
nevertheless result in overall efficiency gains. By shifting commoners' 
discount rates so that future returns become more valuable, these rules 
make continuous cooperation more attractive now. 
A system of direct regulation requires detailed rules properly tailored to 
the specific resource and its particular environmental, economic, and social 
circumstances. Such a contextual and dynamic regulatory scheme can be 
best produced (and adapted periodically) by the commoners, and thus lies 
well within the sphere of democratic self-governance. The formal law, on 
the other hand, is less likely to provide a successful default regime of direct 
regulation that is sufficiently contextual and dynamic. If a default legal 
regime aims to regulate activity directly, the best it will be able to do is to 
handle a wide range of resources tolerably well. For example, direct 
regulation can set general standards of reasonable use, such as a rule 
restricting each commoner to uses that accord with the others' expectations, 
and then leave the door open to local adjustments the parties may make to 
tailor resource use to their specific circumstances. Practically, it can do no 
more. Usually, the default rule of the direct approach involves ratifying 
existing uses as a baseline and enjoining creation of major barriers to 
reasonable new uses. Such vague default rules, although theoretically 
plausible, are not likely to internalize costs very efficiently. Therefore, they 
will not likely be effective anti-opportunistic devices of the sort we seek. 
ii. Indirect Encouragement 
To be effective, the operative background rules that prevent 
overexploitation must be sharper and more precise. In particular, they must 
guarantee that if trust collapses, then the costs of each commoner's use will 
be properly internalized, neutralizing ex ante the incentives for overuse. 
One plausible rule can be simply stated: Every commoner is liable to the 
others for the fair market value of every use calculated pro rata (that is, 
according to ownership share). Alternatively, in settings where the 
underdeterrence concern is significant-notably where the visibility of 
exploitation efforts is low and monitoring is relaxed, as in marriage 140 -
then liberal commons goals may be better achieved using a more stringent 
remedy, for example, one based on recovering the benefits that the violator 
gained from overuse of the commons.141 
140. Where the visibility of exploitation efforts is low, fair-market-value liability may not 
suffice to deter excessive use. There, potential violators can count on some measure of 
underenforcement. They may reasonably expect some probability that deviance will not be sponed 
if monitoring is relaxed, as we expect it to be, until eventually there is major deviance. Also, if the 
panern of deviance is detected late, evidentiary problems may arise because the exact degree of 
earlier excess uses may be harder and more costly to identify, a cost that is aggravated if catching 
extreme exploiters also requires settling the accounts of other, less extreme exploiters. 
141. HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PuBLIC 
· VALUES 18 (1997). Removing ex post the possibility of profit from detected infringements makes 
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At first glance, both the fair-market-value and profits-based formulae 
may seem impractical because calculating the liabilities for overuse would 
impose high administrative costs. But recall that we intend the liability rules 
to work in the background; we doubt that parties in a well-functioning 
commons would routinely turn to such strict accounting rules. Commoners 
would likely perceive a cold accounting for each use (or for each 
investment) to be inappropriate in an ongoing relationship of cooperative 
interaction, mutual trust, and group solidarity. 142 It would also be quite 
expensive to administer. Rather, we expect to find, following Ellickson's 
account, that daily interactions would be governed by a more informal, 
rough mental account of outstanding credits and debits. 143 So long as the 
aggregate account is not radically unbalanced and future interactions can 
provide adequate opportunities for evening up, commoners may not be 
concerned if particular subaccounts are not balanced. 144 
So, the accounting mechanism we suggest is not intended to serve the 
commoners on a daily basis. Its purpose and method is different, consistent 
with our view of the trust-catalyzing role of law. Such a rule assures each 
commoner that even if the commons breaks down, no party will be too 
vulnerable to another's exploitation. By assuring enforcement of a precise 
accounting if the commons fails, the law can enable owners to trust one 
another and to rely on each other's cooperation in the meanwhile.145 This 
trust, to be sure, is not completely cost-free from the commoners' 
perspective. Invoking the anti-opportunistic mechanism requires the 
commoners to invest some amount in monitoring each other. Law can 
facilitate the parties' trust, but it cannot-and probably should not-entirely 
displace the need for each commoner to take some care not to trust others 
too much.146 This indirect legal mechanism, even if imperfect, plays its role 
by relaxing the parties' own monitoring reflexes, by making monitoring 
overuse somewhat less valuable ex ante and thus may more effectively deter violations. To be 
sure, even with this remedy there is still a chance that the infringement will go undetected or that the 
other commoners will fail to pursue their claim, which makes the violator's expected gains greater 
than zero. Nevertheless, the ability to recover the violator's gains makes detecting infringements-
even past infringements-relatively more worthwhile to the other commoners. Id. Where the risk of 
underenforcement is sufficiently high, even a "simple" profits-based remedy may not suffice. In 
these (extreme) cases, the measure of recovery for preventing overuse should be increased so that 
the exploiter's average damages will equal its profit. Technically, this would require that the level 
of damages imposed equal the exploiter's profits divided by the probability of liability. See 
Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 7S N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 3S4, 421 (2000). 
142. ELLICKSON, supra note 123, at 234-36. 
143. Id. at S6; see also Bernstein, supra note 125, at 1796-98 (arguing that trade association 
members rely on informal accounting during ongoing dealing but strict legal accounting during the 
endgame). 
144. ELLICKSON, supra note 123, at S6. 
14S. Omri Ben-Shahar, Rights Eroding from Past Breach, 1 AM. L. & EcON. REV. 190 (2000). 
Contra McKean, supra note 6, at 273-74 (arguing that succes.sful systems "betray an intense concern 
with ... bookkeeping to keep track of contributions and withdrawals from the commons"). 
146. Rose, supra note 12S, at SSS. 
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cheaper, 147 and by lessening a too quick resort to formal law, the types of 
actions that cause others to become suspicious and in tum undermine trust 
and cooperation. 148 
b. Preventing Underinvestment 
Anti-opportunistic mechanisms regarding the parties' investment 
decisions are the mirror image of "anti-overuse" rules. Investment in a 
commons can be a public good with respect to other commoners. Hence, it 
invites free-riding: Individuals may refuse to pay their share, motivated 
solely by the expectation that others' efforts will generate the same good 
free of charge (or at least more cheaply). 149 Free-riding can generate 
underinvestment that would harm any commons and would demoralize any 
community .150 Therefore, unsurprisingly, well-functioning commons 
property regimes set norms that require commoners to contribute their 
proportional share for necessary services invested in the commons. 151 
i. Preservation 
A default legal regime seeking to facilitate liberal commons success 
should formalize investment-protection norms through a rule stating, first, 
that any commoner may unilaterally undertake any investment-even if not 
urgent and with no requirement of the other commoners' prior approval-
reasonably required to prevent harm to the resource and to protect the 
commoners' continued ownership or possession; and second, that the 
147. The mechanisms we suggest make monitoring cheaper indirectly: By supporting trust, 
they encourage the parties to spend Jess on monitoring, because each can expect the others to self~ 
report potential overuses. 
148. Rose, supra note 125, at 556-57. There is another possible objection to the accounting 
mechanism we propose. Our mechanism can never be perfect-and thus the overuse aspect of the 
tragedy of the commons can never be fully overcome-because potential defectors will always be 
able to get away with their opportunism if they overuse or damage the common resource in 
unobservable or unverifiable ways. Cf Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Couns: An 
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 279-80 (1992) 
(discussing the distinction between observable and verifiable information). This critique postulates 
that there are many acts of individual commoners that would be impossible-or, more likely, too 
costly--to observe or to prove in court (even if observed). The critique further implies that a regime 
of private property (the sole owner case) is free from this difficulty. We do not dispute that commons 
property regimes face the difficulty of unobservable or unverifiable infringements. Ellickson, supra 
note 19, at 1329 (comparing the effectiveness of barking dogs as a boundary-infringement device 
with the difficulty of designing commons-shirking detection mechanisms). But this difficulty is not 
wholly absent with private property: Trespassing must be policed and licensees monitored. 
Therefore, if---or, better, in those cases where--the default rules we propose can overcome the 
difficulties of collective action in controlling overuse by way of observable and verifiable acts, the 
liberal commons is not different, in this respect, from so-called Blackstonian private property. 
149. Richard J. Arneson, The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92 Ennes 616, 
621-22 (1982). 
150. See id. at 622. 
151. ELLICKSON, supra note 123, at 71-75, 275; OSTROM, supra note 6, at 49; McKean, supra 
note 6, at 266-67. 
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investing party should be entitled to an immediate pro rata contribution 
from each one of the other commoners. 
The rule protects a cooperating commoner from the others' possible 
opportunism by insuring that parties who invest today will not be exploited 
tomorrow. Like anti-overuse rules, our rule here serves a protective 
function: to encourage parties to give cooperation a chance. The rule would 
be too·cumbersome to invoke on a daily basis, so such ongoing accounting 
would be handled through the ordinary informal norms that we usually see. 
Given the possibility of disputes regarding which preservation measures are 
"reasonably required," along with concern that some commoners may lack 
immediate ability to contribute, the law can back the contribution rule we 
propose with various structural devices, such as insurance-like funds 
collected in advance that provide some assurance of payment when disputes 
arise. 
The investment-protection regime, like its anti-overuse complement 
(and for the same reasons elaborated above), is supposed to function as a 
background norm in the parties' relationship, so its mere existence 
simultaneously encourages efficient levels of investment (by inducing 
investments that would have otherwise been too risky and too open to free-
riding) and inculcates productive trust among commoners. 
ii. Improvements 
In designing a liberal commons, we should take care before we impose 
any contribution obligation. 152 As noted above, that obligation reasonably 
includes expenses aimed at preserving the commons as a whole. 
"Improvements," however, are different from simple "preservation"-
though the line between them is murky. To the extent that improvements 
can be adequately defined, they seem more likely to deviate from the 
parties' original understanding of their common endeavor, so we cannot be 
sure that commoners who refuse to participate are trying to free-ride, rather 
than expressing their own subjective preferences and genuine valuations. 153 
Including improvements in a broad obligation to contribute could offend the 
notion of individual choice inherent in a liberal commons. 154 We think that 
152. See generally Dagan & White, supra note 141, at 385-90 (discussing restitutionary liability 
for unilateral conferral of unsolicited benefits). 
153. As Saul Levmore explains, individual valuations are idiosyncratic because they depend 
on varying abilities to pay for a good and on personal tastes. Levmore gives three exceptions 
where the phenomenon of subjective devaluation would not occur: (I) the recipient has infinite 
wealth; (2) the recipient is a profit-making enterprise where subjective preferences have little role; 
or (3) the nonbargained benefit is easily translated into wealth. Unless those exceptions apply, one 
cannot easily refute the recipient's claim that the recipient preferred to invest money in the 
acquisition of some other benefit more clearly to the recipient's liking. Saul Levmore, Explaining 
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 74-79 (1985). 
154. For the proposition that awarding restitution for unsolicited benefits in cases of varying 
subjective valuations insults the liberal commitment to individual free choice, see PETER BIRKS, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO IBE LAW OF RESTITUTION I 09- 10, 228 (1985); I DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF 
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such considerations justify postponing any obligation to contribute 
respecting improvements until exit, in particular exit that liquidates the 
commons and resolves concerns arising from conflicting subjective 
valuations. 155 
To be sure, these "anti-underinvestment" rules are minimal and, if 
applied broadly, rather crude and suboptimal. Thus, on the one hand, 
improvements may be part of the parties' original understanding. And even 
where they were not foreseen, improvements may be, in some cases, the 
most beneficial course of action (for example, investing in insurance now 
may be more efficient than covering uninsured liabilities later). Similarly, 
there are cases in which even repairing a resource is a losing proposition; 
such a resource is best left to deteriorate.156 
These defects of our default rules would be fatal if they were intended 
to apply to a wide range of investment decisions. However, recall that these 
rules apply only in the sphere of individual dominion, that is, absent a 
majority decision on preservation or investment. They constitute the 
(limited) realm of action in which any single commoner can act 
autonomously on behalf of the group. Given that a more ambitious regime 
regarding investments and improvements is well within the sphere of 
democratic decisionmaking that we propose, it is reasonable to restrict the 
realm of individual choice only to undisputed investments.157 Crude as it is, 
the preservation-improvement divide seems good enough given its limited 
task. 
REMEDIES§ 4.9(2) (2d ed. 1993); John D. McCamus, The Self-Serving lntermeddler and the Law 
of Restitution, 16 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 515, 520 (1978); and Mitchell Mcinnes, Incontrovertible 
Benefits in the Supreme Court of Canada: Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada; Peel 
(Regional Municipality) v. Ontario, 23 CAN. Bus. L.J. 122, 123, 128 (1994). 
155. Levmore explains: 
In partition the property is generally reduced to monetary terms, often by 
sale .... The recipient, whose share of the improvement's value is deducted from his 
share of the property's total value, cannot claim to have been forced to purchase a good 
that he does not value, because he has received in partition the monetary equivalent of 
his share of the improvement. 
Levmore, supra note 153, at 78. This rule leaves a commoner who invests in improvements and 
exits early with no right of contribution. But. as the text above explains, any other rule would 
leave the other commoners too vulnerable to uncalled-for impositions of benefits. And, as we 
indicate below, a commoner who wishes to initiate a common investment in the resource can and 
should resort to democratic self-governance mechanisms. 
156. See Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian 
Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1720, 1727-33 (2000) (explaining how nonpreservation can 
be efficient and giving colorful examples of value-destroying Russian enterprises). 
157. In other words, until the community can reach some agreement on how risk-averse it is 
going to be, our rules should assume that it is maximally risk-averse, so that individual investment 
is reimbursable only when it can be characterized as a protection against erosion. In such a case, 
differences in subjective valuations are unlikely. 
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c. Sharing Fruits and Revenues 
Finally, we take up the problem of distributing the products of a 
commons. A basic principle that complies with the injunctions against 
overuse and underinvestment is that fruits and revenues should be 
distributed in proportion to each commoner's ownership share.158 But what 
should be the rule where the revenues or fruits are not produced by all the 
commoners, but rather by one (or a few) of them? How should fruits and 
revenues be divided when a commoner makes an autonomous decision to 
use the commons resource? 
Three solutions come to mind as default rules. One rule would allow 
the laboring commoner to keep the entire net profit after paying the others 
the fair market value for the use of their shares. A second, diametrically 
opposed possibility is to give the laboring commoner a fair market return 
for the labor and distribute the net profits among all commoners (including 
the laborer) according to their respective ownership shares. Third, an 
intermediate possibility would be to allow the laborer to capture fair market 
value of the labor as well as a proportional share of net profits attributable 
to the labor, with all commoners (including the laborer) splitting the 
remaining surplus. 159 
We see no general way to decide among these approaches. To the 
extent that we are concerned mostly with policing against underinvestment, 
the first rule seems preferable to the second (and, to a lesser degree, the 
third).160 But, as we indicated above, the second rule performs best in 
ameliorating overuse. Also, the second rule (implicitly) conceptualizes the 
labor that any member invests in the commons as invested on behalf of the 
group, and thus seems better designed to inculcate the sense of common 
undertaking crucial for a well-functioning commons. While choosing 
among these choices requires the sort of context-dependent analysis 
attentive to micro and macro values that we discussed earlier, all the 
158. Such is indeed the practice of successful commons regimes. McKean, supra note 6, at 
264-65. 
159. Assume, for example, that there are two commoners, that the fair market value for using 
the resource as a whole (say, a parcel of land) is 40, that the fair market value of the pertinent 
labor is 10, and that the resulting net profit is 100 (after deducting all expenses, including the 10 
in labor paid back to the laboring commoner). The first option would give the passive commoner 
20 (50% of the fair market value of the parcel's use), and leave the laborer 80. The second rule 
would give each party 50 of the profit (so that the laborer does not get any special benefit). The 
third rule would allocate 20% of the net profits to "work" and 80% to "land," thus allowing the 
passive commoner to receive 40 (50% of what has been allocated to "land") and the laborer 60 
(50% of what has been allocated to "land" as well as that part of the net profits that has been 
allocated to" work"). 
160. Lawrence Berger, An Analysis of the Economic Relations Between Cotenants, 21 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1015, 1021-22 (1979) (describing the first rule as "clearly aimed at the reward of his [the 
owner's] present efforts in maximizing the utility of the land"); Robert P. Merges & Lawrence A 
Locke, Co-Ownership of Patents: A Comparative and Economic View, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC'Y 586, 595-96 (1990) (preferring the first rule for co-ownership of patents for similar 
reasons). 
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choices can fall within the range bounded by the liberal commons 
framework. 
2. The Sphere of Democratic Self-Governance 
a. The Virtues of Mobilizing Voice 
So far, we have focused on mechanisms that counteract the potentially 
devastating effects that individual autonomy may have on the efficiency-
even the viability--of commons ownership. At a minimum, within a sphere 
of individual dominion, owners can benefit from the commons resource. 
Now we become more ambitious and explore affirmative ways to support 
the commoners' cooperation, starting with possible rules for democratic 
self-governance. These rules can help potential commoners capture both the 
economic benefits that a viable commons engenders (pooling, joint 
management, risk-spreading) and the social gratifications it generates (the 
psychological rewards of belonging, membership, and collective action). 
Recall that in many circumstances the economic and the social goods are 
intimately related because efficiency, trust, and cooperation tend to be 
mutually reinforcing. 
Our prescriptions draw on findings from social science studies of 
successful, though illiberal, commons. These studies suggest to us that 
democratic self-governance with a large role for majority rule is preferable 
to unanimity rules. By requiring complete agreement on management issues 
and by emboldening holdouts, unanimity rules may lead to anticommons 
tragedy, that is, mutual vetoes that waste a resource through underuse.161 
We believe a democratic regime-appropriately modified to work in our 
liberal framework-would best serve the individual and the group in 
managing a commons resource in a way that maximizes efficient use and 
enriches social relationships. Our regime gives voice to each individual 
commoner and gives the commoners as a group the power to tailor 
management and use of the commons resource to changing environmental, 
economic, and social circumstances. 
The mechanisms we propose amplify each commoner's ability to 
change commons management from within. Resorting to "voice," rather 
than immediately moving to "exit," requires disgruntled parties to have 
some measure of loyalty toward their fellow commoners.162 The 
predisposition to loyalty, however, is not sufficient absent structural 
arrangements that facilitate effective voice. 163 As Hirschman explains, "the 
decision whether to exit will often be taken in light of the prospects for the 
161. Heller, supra note 32, at 622-26 (explaining how the anticommons tragedy operates). 
162. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 67, at 77 (stating that loyalty makes exit less likely and increases 
the likelihood of voice). 
163. Id. at 82 ("While loyalty postpones exit its very existence is predicated on the possibility of 
exit."). 
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effective use of voice." 164 Furthermore, he notes that" voice is essentially an 
art constantly evolving in new directions." 165 Therefore, so long as strong 
exit is possible-and we insist that it always be possible-exit proves an 
easy response to dissatisfaction, and it tends to dominate voice.166 A default 
regime of democratic self-governance that promotes participation is 
required to direct commoners to opt for voice first and to use exit only as a 
last resort. 
Voice is also an important medium for community-building. 
Deliberation over daily decisions concerning the management of the 
commons resource affords commoners an opportunity to engage in 
dialogue. In this dialogue, the commoners may attempt to synthesize their 
divergent experiences and preferences while reaching a collective 
decision. 167 Such experience is a means of socialization, one that helps 
refine the commoners' values and inculcates collective commitments. Thus, 
the sphere of democratic self-governance is significant not only because it 
may result instrumentally in more efficient decisions. Democratic self-
governance is also important to inculcate the noneconomic goal of 
cooperation, enriching the commoners' interpersonal relationships and 
solidifying their interpersonal capital. Democratic self-governance requires 
attention to both jurisdictional boundary norms and procedural rules. 
b. Jurisdictional Boundary Norms 
Successful commons regimes, Ostrom reports, are characterized by 
"collective-choice arrangements" that permit most affected individuals to 
"participate in modifying the operational rules." 168 These arrangements 
allow that "the individuals who directly interact with one another and with 
the physical world can modify the rules over time so as to better fit them to 
the specific circumstances of their setting." 169 
Applying Ostrom's prescription within a legal regime for a liberal 
commons is not easy. In particular, difficult decisions arise concerning how 
best to determine the boundaries of group jurisdiction, that is, the scope of 
decisions governed by a democratic governance regime. On one side, the 
need for dynamic management and the problem of anticommons tragedy 
both point toward a relatively broad majority-rule jurisdiction. Broad 
majority-rule jurisdiction also seems to correspond well with a social 
context of trust and cooperation, one that understands the group, rather than 
164. Id.at37. 
165. Id. at 43. 
166. See id. at 36-43. 
167. Cf Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND 
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 329, 346-48 (Andrei Mannor ed., 1995) (arguing, 
based on Aristotle, that pooling of experiences and perspectives produces better decisions than 
any one individual could reach alone). 
168. OSTROM, supra note 6, at 93. 
169. Id. 
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its individual members, as the ultimate owner of the commons resource. On 
the other side, however, a liberal commons-like liberal regimes 
generally-must be aware of the risks of majority rule and set jurisdictional 
boundaries to mitigate these risks. Broad majority rule easily turns into 
minority exploitation, especially if it extends the jurisdiction of the 
majority, as we think it should, to the most significant decisions concerning 
the management of the commons resource. And the risk of minority 
exploitation tends, as we have seen, to frustrate ab initio the possibility of 
trust and cooperation and instead to make exit the commoner's dominant 
route to protecting autonomy. Therefore, a grant of broad jurisdictional 
scope to the majority must be limited by protections against abuses arising 
from that broad jurisdiction. 
These two guidelines may seem vague and contradictory, but we think 
that they can be reasonably clarified. The goal is to prescribe jurisdictional 
boundaries that would minimize conflict between majority and minority 
interests. 170 One approach could be to allow majority rule in a broad realm 
of management and investment decisions-including giving the majority 
the power to lease or mortgage the commons resource or to make extensive 
and substantial investments (or to decide upon divestment)-so long as the 
majority focuses on increasing the size of the collective utility pie. Such an 
increase in majority power, however, increases the risk that the majority 
will exploit the minority, so we would also prescribe sharper limits on 
majority sovereignty whenever decisions are more easily characterized as 
redistributive, particularly when they shift utility from the minority to the 
majority. 171 
170. These boundaries have been extensively debated in many contexts, such as procedures for 
granting variances from public zoning schemes, for judicial review of decisions by residential 
associations, or for judicial review of decision rules in partnerships or close corporations. E.g., 
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Viii. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994) (clarifying the process for 
decisionmaking by condominium associations and the applicable standards of court review); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES§ 6.13(2) & cmt. a (2000) (discussing the duties 
of a condominium association to its members and standards of judicial review of condominium 
association decisions). 
171. Notice that the rule against purely distributive majority decisions protects both shifting 
and stable minorities. This rule would invalidate, in other words, not only decisions that seize an 
opportunity to rip off one or a few commoners who are, for some reason, isolated at a given 
moment. It also invalidates decisions with no sound utilitarian basis that systemically disfavor the 
preferences of a more stable minority. On the other hand, a stable minority is not protected, and 
should not be protected, where such a utilitarian basis exists. The meaning of majority rule is that, 
so long as the procedural safeguards discussed below are observed, the majority can, for example, 
legislate aggregate-utility maximizing rules regarding the use of the resource even if these rules 
systematically correspond to the majority's preferences. Absent an intent to injure the minority, a 
majority is allowed to make decisions that benefit itself much more than they benefit the minority, 
even when an alternative decision would benefit all equally, but to a lesser extent. To be sure, 
there may be contexts in which micro or macro values outside the liberal commons framework 
could point toward more egalitarian solutions. In these contexts, applying a strict utilitarian test 
could undermine trust by giving the minority the impression that they are inferior or that they are 
the suckers. But in many other contexts-where egalitarian commitments are not in play-a 
utilitarian calculus seems to work tolerably well. 
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A knotty problem arises in evaluating the validity of a majority decision 
to leave the commons resource unused. What counts as the baseline of use 
or nonuse is a difficult question that has been extensively debated in the 
nuisance, takings, and land use literatures,172 and will not be recapitulated 
here. In most cases, however, a decision to stop using the commons can 
reasonably be deemed outside the domain of the majority rule, because it 
does not usually maximize the commoners' utility and is relatively more 
likely to be a strategically motivated move to impair the minority's welfare 
expectations. A distributive intention to freeze the minority out should 
render the majority's decision illegitimate; thus the application of majority 
decisionmaking there would be invalid. But a majority may be able to 
redeem its nonuse decision if it can show utility-maximizing reasons. 
In many cases, a utility-maximizing reason could be based on an 
efficiency calculus, such as a showing that market conditions exist under 
which current use would generate losses, or a demonstration that a "time-
out" is economically useful for paying off debts and searching for 
alternative low cost uses. 173 Efficiency, to be sure, should not be the ohly 
consideration that can legitimate majority decisions. Other utility-
maximizing considerations-such as environmental conservation, a simple 
preference for realizing revenue later, or different levels of risk tolerance-
can also render majority decisions legitimate. But making an efficiency 
showing suggests, at least to a point, that the majority decision is not 
motivated by strategic exploitation of the minority. In those unusual cases 
where judges or other arbiters are called in, they may be able to improve on 
an efficiency analysis by also evaluating evidence more directly related to 
commoners' subjective utility functions. Judgments about subjective utility 
are bound to require complicated assessments because utility is both 
wealth-dependent and taste-dependent. But messy as these judgments are, 
they are no different from myriad other rules throughout the law that 
invoke-usually implicitly-utilitarian balancing. 
Finally, we do not privilege the original intent of the founding 
commoners regarding the majority's decisionmaking jurisdiction (unless, of 
course, such intent has been enshrined by certain constitutional 
agreements). Success in the liberal commons context-as with private 
and commons property-requires dynamic adjustments to changing 
circumstances. Hence, there is always a chance that the preferences of the 
majority will, at some point, substantially shift away from those of certain 
172. E.g., Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the law of 
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1011-12 (1999) (discussing when compensation is appropriate in 
takings cases based on a nuisance rationale); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1196-
97 (1967) (same). 
173. Furthermore, it may well be that in such a case it is the minority's insistence to continue 
an inefficient (and positively harmful) use that is strategic. 
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minority members.174 So long as the minority has not been exploited-in 
other words, absent prohibited redistributive motivations or 
consequences-and given the minority's ability to exit, we do not think that 
the jurisdictional boundaries for democratic self-governance should 
incorporate any conservative bias. 
c. Procedural Norms 
Margaret McKean provides a rich account of procedural norms for 
democratic self-governance. In successful commons regimes, she reports, 
commoners "convene regularly in a deliberative body to make decisions 
about opening and closing the commons," set harvest dates, decide "rules 
governing the commons," and also "adjudicate conflicts" among 
themselves. 175 These bodies, as she describes them, seem to operate 
typically along republican democratic lines.176 Not only is power 
decentralized so that there is no hierarchy separating leadership (even if 
elected) from citizens, 177 but also there often appears to be significant 
emphasis on collective deliberation. To ensure adherence to the decisions 
the group adopts, deliberative bodies pay attention to the views of all 
eligible users of the commons. 178 Although formally majoritarian, these 
bodies in practice usually foster consensual decisionmaking.179 Democratic 
governance operates as a background rule, while daily decisi?nmaking in 
the absence of deeply held dissent is governed by a social norm of 
unanimity. This background/operational split legitimates and promotes 
consensus but does not create a formal anticommons structure, with its 
attendant tragedy. 
Republican democratic governance can be viable only in social 
environments characterized by trust and cooperation. In other settings, such 
as the paradigm of a public corporation, republicanism may be both 
unnecessary and too costly. A hforarchical governance structure may better 
174. See Gillette, supra note 91, at 1425 (describing how changing circumstances may 
frustrate some homeowners' original expectations in a housing association). 
175. McKean, supra note 6, at 258. These bodies had reasons to convene other than 
management of the commons. As McKean explains, this made management more efficient by 
lessening the transaction costs of assembling for these purposes. Id. at 260. 
176. Id. at 260-61. See generally Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493 (1988). 
Id. 
177. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1350. 
178. McKean, supra note 6, at 260-61. As McKean explains: 
Disgruntled violators ... could begin to free-ride ... or to shirk ... if they felt 
that the maintenance of the commons was no longer in their interest because the rules 
were unfair. And they could free-ride as individuals even if they could not overcome 
the collective action dilemma in order to demand changes in governance of the 
commons. 
179. Id. at 261. 
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facilitate the parties' collective action. 180 But notice again that republican 
governance in the appropriate social context is more likely to develop the 
trust and cooperation it requires and to facilitate and encourage members' 
part1c1pation. Participatory democracy can intensify the parties' 
interpersonal relations; so republicanism, with its attendant limitation on the 
size of the commoners' group, is an important institutional mechanism for 
community-building. Interpersonal relations and community, in turn, 
reinforce trust and facilitate cooperation. 
These lessons can be incorporated into a legal regime of a liberal 
commons. Along with recourse to majority rule rather than to 
administration by elected officials, a liberal commons regime committed to 
republican democratic governance would require prescriptions respecting 
disclosure, consultation, and fair hearing. Before majorities act, they should 
disclose relevant facts that arguably justify the proposed action and make 
room for open discussion by dissenting parties in a forum where all sides 
must listen to opponents' views and give reasons for their stances. Finally, 
minority complaints of due process deprivations or substantive exploitation 
should be capable of triggering mediation or judicial intervention. 
These mechanisms significantly facilitate successful liberal commons 
property. Procedural safeguards calm the concern of the parties that others 
will maneuver behind their backs. Such mechanisms also can recruit the 
judiciary to support the parties' cooperation by serving as a forum for 
dispute resolution that can "provide solutions that permit [them] to end 
their quarrels and to get on with their lives." 181 And where no such 
reconciliation is possible, a court can be advised to order dissolution of the 
commons, because for hostile parties, ownership and management of 
commons resources is bound to yield tragedy. Finally, the requirement of 
open-minded consultation-although difficult to enforce because the 
majority can often carry it out in a purely superficial way-facilitates 
republican social norms because it provides commoners with standards and 
guidelines for conduct and judgment they each can expect the others will 
generally follow in a social context generally governed by cooperation and 
mutual trust. 182 
180. See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, 
Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 34-36 (1991) (describing how landlords, 
contracting separately with each tenant, may be better able to maximize aggregate tenant preferences 
than cooperatives or condominiums). 
181. Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68, 71 (1991) 
(discussing the dispute resolution function of law). 
182. Cf HART, supra note 125, at 79-88 (discussing law as a source of reasons for action); 
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The 
Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1429 (1978) (describing the difficulty of 
controlling behavior through "aspirational commands" from legislatures or courts). 
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d. Promoting Tailor-Made Adjustments 
The rules we have discussed so far provide a starting point for people 
who inadvertently become commoners and for those who would voluntarily 
become commoners if they did not have to incur the costs of custom-
tailoring their default legal regime through contract. But for commoners 
who can bear some contracting costs, background rules supporting freedom 
of contract can provide another, simple method of legal facilitation for a 
successful commons. 
To prosper, the commoners must be relatively free from the authority of 
outside bodies in managing the commons, a freedom McKean calls 
"independent jurisdiction." 183 Providing "substantial local autonomy" 184 is 
an easy, but crucially important, way to supplement the more active 
methods of commons ownership facilitation we have already discussed. The 
web of default background rules-significant up to a point---cannot by its 
nature be sufficient for every case of liberal commons property, because 
each resource carries unique features. 
Therefore, alongside the law's active support for commons ownership 
via anti-opportunistic and institution-building rules, the law should also 
offer what may be called passive support; that is, the law should reflect a 
liberal approach respecting the content of any private "constitutional 
arrangements" commoners may wish to adopt. So long as exit is 
appropriately preserved (within the limits set below), and provided third 
parties are not injured, 185 the law should allow people to agree ex ante on 
whatever constitutional arrangements they prefer respecting rights and 
obligations regarding the resource, its management and use, or rules for 
dissolution. By adding a liberal approach to contracting, people can tailor 
their default rules so that they are ever more responsive to particular 
resource needs, technological changes, and evolving local norms.186 
3. The Sphere of Cooperation-Enhancing Exit 
a. The Many Faces of Exit 
Appropriate mechanisms of anti-opportumstlc guarantees and 
democratic self-governance begin to move ownership and management of 
commons resources away from their seemingly tragic predicament; well-
calibrated cooperation-enhancing exit completes the story. Unlike commons 
183. McKean, supra note 6, at 259. 
184. OSlROM, supra note 6, at 212. 
185. A possible limitation could include protecting against the negative externalities that may 
arise from excessive fragmentation of property rights. See Heller, supra note 56, at 1173-74. 
186. Private constitutions raise several questions that cannot properly be addressed here, 
regarding both the outer limits of freedom of contract (especially in contexts that may raise 
concerns of systematic exploitation) and the possibility of unwritten constitutions. 
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success stories that sacrifice exit to build community, a liberal commons 
preserves a commitment to individual exit. Indefinite restrictions on exit 
cannot be legitimized in a liberal commons. 
Exit, however, is not a unitary concept, although it is frequently and 
mistakenly treated as such. Sometimes, freedom to alienate one's share is 
sufficient to protect exit; other times, nothing short of dissolution will do--
dissolution rules include, to name a few examples, partition in co-
ownership law, divorce in family law, termination of trusts or partnerships, 
and liquidation of corporations. Furthermore, for both alienation and 
dissolution, there exists a range of mechanisms that serve community-
preserving functions without substantially compromismg liberal 
commitments. These mechanisms help insure that the exiter' s decision is 
informed (not hasty and ignorant) and sincere (not opportunistic), thus 
refining the class of exit decisions that are consistent with preserving 
cooperation arid that should be protected from a liberal standpoint. 
b. Restraints Can Enhance Cooperation 
Just like rules governing daily life in a commons, exit rules do not serve 
as operative regulatory norms. But they can serve, as in the spheres of 
individual dominion and democratic self-governance, as background rules 
whose mere existence protects the commoners from defection, abuse of 
trust, and exploitation. If so, cooperation-promoting exit rules may be tuned 
so that they contribute to commons ownership success and perhaps even 
support its establishment ex ante. To function as anti-opportunistic 
mechanisms, alienation and dissolution rules should safeguard commoners 
from unjust deprivation of utility by other cornmoners.187 Hence, these rules 
should contain an injunction against redistribution, ensuring a scrupulous 
allocation of the resource or its worth corresponding to the parties' initial 
(and subsequent) investments. 
Liberal commons settings include forms where the initial entry can 
range along a spectrum from involuntary to voluntary. For example, the 
classic involuntary forms are when heirs inherit property or when neighbors 
are locked into a riparian regime for stream use. By contrast, voluntary 
forms include any time people choose to enter into a property institution 
such as a marriage or condominium. Cooperation-enhancing limitations on 
exit become increasingly problematic wheri entry is involuntary, because 
they infringe more severely upon individual freedom of choice. As we shift 
along the spectrum toward voluntary entry, more intrusive cooperation-
187. Cf Green, supra note 68, at 178-79 (discussing "principles of justice in dissolution, 
conditioned by the legitimate expectations of the members"). Attempts to deprive others unjustly can 
be initiated either by the majority or by the minority (or one individual commoner). In the fonner 
case, preventing unjust deprivation not only serves as an anti-opportunistic device, but also is crucial 
to securing practical (and not merely theoretical) exit. See id. In the latter case, preventing unjust 
deprivation safeguards against independent exploiters who· want to take the money and run. 
598 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 549 
enhancing limitations on exit may nevertheless be consistent with liberal 
values. 
Similarly, liberal commons settings include forms in which the 
"intensity" of membership ranges along a spectrum from limited to 
comprehensive. Thus, there are some forms-such as close corporations 
and condominium associations-where the common interest is relatively 
limited, so that the commoners preserve many other areas of individual 
control. Other forms are more comprehensive or inclusive-think of 
marriage-so that the sharing covers significant aspects of the commoners' 
lives. Cooperation-enhancing limitations on exit become increasingly 
problematic when membership is inclusive (as it is with the involuntary 
forms mentioned above) because they infringe more severely upon 
individual freedom of choice. As we shift along the spectrum back toward 
limited intensity, more intrusive cooperation-enhancing limitations on exit 
may nevertheless be consistent with liberal values. 
c. Alienation vs. Dissolution 
When is dissolution even necessary to preserve liberal exit? That is, 
when is a right of alienation not enough? Another way of posing the 
problem is to ask when a departing individual should be able to break up a 
liberal commons. For some property forms, such as the condominium 
association or perhaps the cooperative, sale may be a sufficient protection 
for liberal exit, and the repertoire of alienation restraints we discuss below 
is enough to protect cooperation values. In these cases, particularly where 
cooperation is based more on voluntary entry and its intensity is limited, a 
liberal commons does not require allowing the possibility of dissolution that 
has both community-destruction and private-benefit-destruction effects. 188 
Often, however, sale does not sufficiently protect exit, because it can be 
expected to undervalue the pro rata ownership share of the exiter. This 
undervaluation is increasingly likely and significant in settings where the 
noneconomic benefits of cooperation and the gains from participation are 
more central to use of the commons resource.189 
d. Three Mechanisms 
Regarding both alienation and dissolution, a range of mechanisms may 
promote cooperation-enhancing exit, for example, cooling-off periods, exit 
188. The private-benefit-destruction effect may arise in cases where one (or some) of the 
commoners developed private benefits related to her share in the commons (benefits that are not 
shared by everyone or not shared equally). 
189. A typical example for this category is co-ownership of a family farm, discussed below in 
Part IV. Even in these cases, however, we believe that a majority that seeks to resist the breakup 
of the community should be able to buy out the party seeking exit, so long as that party is fully 
compensated for the value of her share. See infra text accompanying note 197. 
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taxes, and rights of first refusal. However, our endorsement of these 
mechanisms is not unlimited. To remain consistent with a liberal framework, 
we must fine-tune these mechanisms so that they continue to protect a 
certain class of exit decisions, those that are informed and sincere.190 
i. Cooling-Off Periods 
An unlimited right to exit can threaten cooperation and efficiency by 
generating a domino effect, a problem especially severe because of the 
asymmetrical information inherent in the decision to exit. Insights from 
cognitive psychology help refine this seemingly unequivocal conclusion. In 
game-theoretic terms, they teach us that when people repeat interactions, 
they typically come to view their relationship as if it were of endless or 
unknown duration, a conception that can lead them to switch to voluntary 
cooperation. Even when the horizon is definite, cooperation may be 
possible so long as the horizon is distant enough. The domino effect, with 
defection as a dominant strategy, operates only for certain short-time-
horizon games. 191 
This cognitive psychology finding suggests that law can provide a 
useful role in facilitating cooperation and efficiency by allowing temporary 
restraints on exit. Limited restraints on alienation and on rights to call for 
dissolution can help create a brief "grace period" that may extend the 
horizon of exit enough to catalyze mutual long-term cooperation. This 
marginal compromise on exit, allowing parties to lock themselves in a 
commons for a time, may help lead them to adopt a strategy of tit-for-tat 
which fully "rational" parties would adopt only in indefinite games. And 
once cooperation begins, it will arguably yield social and efficiency gains 
that would, as we have seen, support the parties' continued trust and 
cooperation. Hence, tweaking exit may turn the tide against the pessimistic 
scenario of the tragedy of the commons and build momentum toward the 
types of successful cooperation that can carry the day.192 
190. Note that this approach, which disfavors opportunistic exit, requires a measure of 
instrumental reasoning. However, the instrumental analysis is deployed here to refine the class of 
exit decisions protected from a liberal standpoint, not as an end in itself. 
191. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME llIEORY 135 (1994). 
As an aside, recall that in all these cases, the norms of well-socialized commoners can override law-
created incentives. 
192. Cf Scott & Scott, supra note 123, at 1283 (arguing that a cooling-off period "reduces 
the risk of asymmetric investment" by reducing the risk of strategic exit or threats of exit and 
encourages the parties to invest in the relationship even where the expected reciprocity is long-
term). Some may object to our reliance on people's irrationality as a means for driving the right 
outcome, suggesting that our solution offends transparency, which is another important liberal 
value, and-even more importantly-is disrespectful of people. But both of these objections must 
be wrong. People's cognitive biases do not necessarily disappear if they are exposed, and thus 
there is no need to conceal the law's reliance on these failures. Further, there is no reason to think 
of such deviations from the rational-actor model in derogatory terms. Some of the most rewarding 
goods in life cannot and should not be reduced to market rationality. See generally ANDERSON, 
supra note 123, at 141-67 (discussing the ethical limitations of market rationality). 
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In most, if ·not all, cases, a cooling-off period corresponds to, rather 
than undermines, our liberal commitments, because it helps ensure that a 
decision to exit is informed and sincere. A cooling-off period gives more 
time for the benefits of cooperation to be perceived and allows transitory 
emotions to cool. Even if at the end exit still occurs, the cooling-off period 
allows a departing exploiter-namely, an insincere exiter-to be caught 
more readily and compelled to disgorge unjust profits. 
ii. Exit Taxes 
If prohibitive, exit taxes are incompatible with our liberal 
commitments, in part because they can thwart the desires of commoners 
who want to flee majority exploitation. But if reasonable, exit taxes can 
serve as an important cooperation-enhancing device, as well as ensure that 
the exiter' s decision is informed and sincere. The dividing line between the 
prohibitive and the reasonable is imprecise, but by no means arbitrary. Exit 
taxes are reasonable and thus legitimate if they serve either a protective 
function Dr a deterrence function, but only up to a point. 
As a protective device, exit taxes ensure th.at people will not decide to 
exit too casually, and help protect innocent commoners from the potential 
harm caused by one member's exit. In this role, exit taxes should monetize 
the destructive effects of exit, targeting, in the alienation example, the costs 
of recruitment and socialization of a replacement commoner who can 
effectively replace the exiter (including the associated monitoring costs), 
and, in the dissolution case, ameliorating the costs of community breakup. 
As a deterrence device, exit taxes should set a limit on incentives to 
defect, thus deterring opportunistic departure.193 In this context, an arguably 
appropriate measure (balancing administrative costs against potential 
underdeterrence) is the present value of the benefits to the exiter that the 
commoners conferred assuming that the exiter would remain in a long-term 
relationship with the other commoners. 194 Restitution of such noncash 
benefits does not violate liberal commitments to free choice if, but only if, 
these benefits were willingly accepted by the member, or can be easily 
reduced into wealth. 195 
193. One concern with exit taxes is that, by increasing the incentive needed before exit 
becomes rational, they may induce opportunists to exploit even more to justify their costs on ex.it. 
If so, then exit taxes would not ameliorate, but rather exacerbate exploitation. But by pushing 
potential exploiters to be so greedy, exit taxes can also significantly increase the likelihood of 
detection. This effect is likely to (at least) counterbalance the concern of exacerbating 
exploitation. 
194. See generally Hanoch Dagan, Encroachments: Between Private and Public, in 1HE 
COMPARATIVE LAW OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT (David Johnston & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
forthcoming 2001) (arguing that restitution of benefits is the appropriate measure for deterring 
infringements). 
195. Dagan & White, supra note 141, at 387-89. But see Rosen, supra note 78, at 1101. Rosen's 
only stipulation on this matter is that" [r]ules requiring disgorgement of particular economic benefits 
allocated to the community member on the assumption that he or she would be a lifetime member 
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A problem may arise even if exit taxes are appropriately set to address 
either the protective or the deterrence functions. A correctly set exit tax 
may nevertheless be so high that it has the effect of practically locking 
members into their current communities. In such a case, there is an 
unavoidable choice between the commitment to enhance cooperation and 
the liberal value of preserving exit. We would lean toward a more cautious 
attitude, by which we mean one that requires both justification under the 
protective or deterrence rationales and assurance that members can leave.196 
iii. Rights of First Refusal 
Rights of first refusal may represent another modest limitation on exit 
aimed at facilitating cooperation.197 For alienation, such rights target the 
commoners' often reasonable concern regarding the possibility of 
undesirable entrants: 198 Rights of first refusal allow the group some degree 
of control over the identity of future transferees of the current commoners. 
More importantly, these rights provide a mechanism for preventing the 
entry of noncooperative parties as well as for preventing exploitation by 
exiters who may be motivated either by spite or by the possibility of side 
payments from remaining members to ensure cooperative replacements. 
Regarding dissolution, rights of first refusal may be an effective means 
of preserving community where a subset of members resist breaking up the 
community and are willing to buy out the party seeking exit. To preserve 
exit given such a buy-out right, the price should be set according to the fair 
market value of the exiter's share (minus the exit taxes, if they apply) if the 
commons resource were dissolved. 199 Only when the majority is not willing 
or able to exercise its buy-out option should dissolution be necessary. 
* * * 
should be presumptively valid to the extent such provisions do not make exit an impossibility." Id. 
Our approach above is more careful about autonomy. 
196. Ideally, exit taxes should be calibrated in utility terms, which requires that they take into 
account wealth disparities. In some settings this fine-tuning may prove, however, to be too 
cumbersome from an administrative standpoint. 
197. The conventional wisdom has long been that these rights have, at most, a minimal effect 
on property value because they do not impede alienation. E.g., 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN 
ON CONTRACTS § 11.3, at 484-85 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1996). Recent work, though, 
suggests that, because of the high search and negotiation costs of bidding on unique property 
subject to first refusal rights, alienation (and hence owner exit) may be significantly burdened. 
David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. I, 16-18, 43-46 
(1999); see also Marcel Kahan, An Economic Analysis of Rights of First Refusal (June 1999) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (modeling the value of rights of first 
refusal and rights of first offer). 
198. See McKean, supra note 6, at 263 (noting that successful commons regimes tend to have 
careful eligibility screening for individual households). 
199. As an aside, rights of first refusal may raise issues of discrimination when existing 
insiders restrict entry, but these issues are better policed through familiar antidiscrimination 
mechanisms. On this point, see sources cited supra note 94. 
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The three spheres of a liberal commons work together, as Table 1 
summarizes. The sphere of individual dominion provides anti-opportunism 
mechanisms that can yield economic and social gains over private property. 
The sphere of democratic self-governance can make voice effective by 
facilitating trust and participation, thus allowing dynamic, satisfying, and 
prosperous management of the commons resource. Finally, well-calibrated 
cooperation-enhancing exit can build momentum for continuity in a 
commons while preserving individual autonomy. This synthesis holds, at 
least in theory. The next Part examines whether the liberal commons 
template helps one understand a case study in law and practice. 
TABLE 1. A THEORY OF THE LIBERAL COMMONS 
1. Preserve the 
Liberal Value of 
Exit 
2. Achieve Gains 
from Cooperation 
3. Use Law To 
Catalyze Trust 
1. The Sphere of 
Individual 
Dominion 
2. The Sphere of 
Democratic 
Self-Governance 
3. The Sphere of 
Cooperation-. 
Enhancing Exit 
Recognize the link between exit and autonomy 
Accept reasonable limits on entry 
Maximize economic gains from resource use 
Strengthen social and interpersonal values 
Recognize the limits of direct legal control 
Deploy law as a safety net to strengthen social norms 
Deter opportunistic overuse and underinvestment 
Help create fruits and revenues and divide them fairly 
Use default rules to promote well-tempered voice 
Enable broad majority rule, yet protect the minority 
Create deterrent and protective exit mechanisms 
Protect exit decisions that are informed and sincere 
IV. TRAGIC CHOICE IN AMERICAN Co-OWNERSHIP 
Modem property law is a story of introducing and refining new liberal 
commons types, from versions of the close corporation, to common-interest 
communities, all the way to versions of marital property law, with each 
• 
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variant spelling out default settings for the three spheres of action, and then 
encouraging experimentation and custom-tailoring. Even old-fashioned law 
has pockets of highly articulated solutions to the problems of shared 
ownership, usually regimes addressed to particular natural resources, such 
as riparian law regarding running water, or unitization rules for oil fields.200 
While our future work201 will show how the liberal commons helps make 
sense of numerous legal institutions-and in turn how understanding these 
institutions refines the liberal commons framework-here we explore a 
fraught story drawn from old-fashioned default rules, rules that have proven 
poorly tailored to liberal commons goals. 
The default American law of co-ownership invites tragedy: It 
undermines cooperation even when co-owners seek to work together, 
encourages distrust and misuse that may delay or even prevent use of 
emerging resources, and, more generally, imposes enduring losses 
whenever strategic behaviors or transaction costs deter people from 
voluntarily adopting a more tailored liberal commons form. American law 
currently forces people to choose between laboriously contracting for their 
own liberal commons or suffering under existing background rules that 
encourage conflict, mismanagement, and division. Property law can do 
better. 
The decline in black rural landownership detailed in the first Section of 
this Part forms the backdrop for our co-ownership case study. The decline 
in black landownership that has frequently been understood as an inevitable 
result of the workings of ownership and management of commons 
resources may instead be, in some part, the contingent result of discrete 
legal choices. The second Section shows that the American law of co-
ownership incorporates choices in each sphere of action that disfavor 
effective commons ownership. For each choice that American law makes, 
we counterpose choices made by other developed legal systems that are 
more supportive of liberal commons goals. Seen from this global 
perspective, the American system is an outlier on a spectrum. To the extent 
law matters in shaping behavior, the comparative approach suggests some 
room for useful legal reform. 
A. The Disappearance of Black Rural wndowners 
1. An Initial Caveat to This Fraught Example 
As an initial caveat, we should note that this Section does not make any 
of several possible claims regarding declining black farmland ownership. 
200. See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY 407 (3d ed. 1989). 
201. The next two articles planned in this series will be authored by Carolyn Frantz and 
Hanoch Dagan, see supra note 64, and Michael Heller and Rick Hills, see supra note 65. 
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First, we do not claim, or believe, that the law of co-ownership accounts, in 
a strong sense, for declining black ownership rates. Rather, we suspect that 
in a regression analysis, farm size would statistically explain most of the 
decline: Similar-sized white-owned farms and solely-owned black farms 
have also largely disappeared. Second, and relatedly, we do not claim that 
comprehensive reform of co-ownership law, if made in previous 
generations, would have operated directly to preserve black farms. The 
effects of poverty and race discrimination have been such that black 
farmers would likely have been done out of their land (by loan sharks and 
other scam artists) even if the law of co-ownership had been more 
favorable. Third, we do not claim that any individual legal change would 
make a difference for potential black farmers. Given our view of how law 
operates to affect behavior, farmers would be unlikely to act on, or even be 
aware of, any discrete law reform. Finally, we do not claim that remaining 
on uneconomic farms would necessarily have been a good outcome. For 
many black families, the best use of heir ownership shares often was 
precisely to finance education and escape from a hostile and hopeless social 
milieu. 
Instead, we raise the black land case in a more tentative spirit, meant to 
illustrate how the liberal commons approach helps frame new questions, 
provoke research, and suggest attractive reforms. The material provides a 
backdrop for, and gives some texture to the evaluation of, the law reforms 
we discuss in the following Section. Had the law been supportive of 
cooperation in the spirit of the liberal commons, its behavioral and 
expressive effects might have helped to change the outcome for at least 
some black farm families, those who wanted to maintain their farms but 
were driven off in part by the unintended consequences of bad law.202 While 
no individual law reform would seem likely to have mattered much in this 
example, collectively, the package of reforms we propose might have made 
some difference, and may yet matter for emerging resources with the same 
analytic structure that are subject to a similar legal regime. 
2. The Rise and Fall of Heir Property 
Consider a common tale of commons property: In 1887, John Brown, a 
black man, bought eighty acres of land in Rankin County, Mississippi; in 
1935, he died intestate, leaving his wife and children as heirs who in turn 
also died intestate, leaving the land to their children and grandchildren.203 
202. For another exploration of the interaction of race and political/legal structure, see 
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 92. While race discrimination was undeniably an integral aspect 
of blacks' exclusion from southern primaries, Issacharoff and Pildes show that this argument 
misses the structural reasons for all-white primaries. Id. at 662-64. 
203. See EMERGENCY LAND FlJND, THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY ON BLACK RURAL LAND 
TENURE IN THE SOUTHEASTERN REGION OF THE UNITED ST A TES 283-86 (1980) [hereinafter HEIR 
PROPERTY]. See generally Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: 
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One of these grandchildren, Willie Brown, began consolidating ownership 
in the land by buying the interests of five of John's nine children: Frances, 
Minnie, Adda, Joe, and Lizzie. By the time Willie died, he had accumulated 
an undivided 41/72d interest, which he left to his wife Ruth. In 1978, Ruth 
filed for partition in kind of the farm, asking that her interest be physically 
separated from the remainder held by sixty-six other Brown heirs, whose 
interests ranged from 1/18th down to l/19,440th of the farm.204 The court, 
however, ordered the land partitioned by sale with the proceeds divided 
among the heirs. 205 At the sale, a white-owned lumber company outbid 
Ruth. 206 Ruth got some cash-more than she was willing or able to pay, but 
perhaps less than she would have demanded to compensate her for the 
farm's subjective value in preserving her family's cohesion and traditions. 
Just after the Civil War, when John Brown bought his eighty acres, black 
landownership in America began a steep rise. Nearly a century later, Ruth 
Brown lost her family land, and black landownership had nearly 
disappeared. 
The uprooting of landed heirs is an oft-repeated tale in black America, 
particularly in the rural South.207 From 1920 to 1978, the number of black-
operated farms in the United States dropped 94%, from almost one million 
to just over 57,000; by comparison, white-operated farms dropped 56%, 
from about 5.4 million to 2.4 million.208 In absolute terms, there are fewer 
than 19,000 black farmers in America today-less than 1 % of American 
farmers-and black Americans continue to abandon farms at a rate three 
times that of white Americans. 209 Why? Leave aside racial discrimination 
and wealth effects for the moment, factors that matter in this story and to 
which we return.210 Some scholarly explanations for the precipitous decline 
of black landownership have focused on the role of partition sales, which 
Undennining Black Landownership, Political Independence and Community Through Partition Sales 
of Tenancies in Common (1999) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Wisconsin) (on file with 
The Yale Law Journal) (discussing the role of partition sales in declining black farmland ownership 
and collecting sources). 
204. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 284-86 (listing the heirs' interests and reproducing the 
Brown family tree). 
205. Id. at 283. 
206. Id. 
207. See BLACK FARMING, supra note I, at 45. In 1982, 85% of all black farmers were 
concentrated in the South, but they were rare even there, totaling only about 6% of Southern farmers. 
Id. 
208. Id. at 2-3. Between 1959 and 1969, the number of black commercial farm operators 
declined by 84%, compared to 26% for white operators. Id. at 40. Between 1970 and 1980, the black 
farm population dropped 65%, compared to 22% for the white population. Id. at 44. For state-by-
state data on declining black landownership, see OFFICE OF MINORITY Bus. ENTER., U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, LAND AND MINORITY ENTERPRISE: THE CRISIS AND TI!E OPPORTUNITY (1976). For a 
county-by-county breakdown of black landownership in the South, see BROWNE, supra note 3, at 
apps. Q-W. 
209. Settlement, supra note 1; see also BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 44 (indicating that, of 
America's six million farm residents in 1982, 4% were black Americans). 
210. Settlement, supra note 1 (discussing decades of routine discrimination by the Department 
of Agriculture in denying crucial loans to black farmers); see also infra text accompanying notes 
225-226. 
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are the background legal mechanism governing disposition of co-owned 
land in the Brown family saga.211 Over a quarter of remaining black-owned 
land in the Southeast is now "heir property" averaging eight co-owners, 
five of whom live outside the Southeast.212 By 1986, "more Mississippi 
land [was] owned by blacks in Chicago than by blacks in Mississippi." 213 
As one study concludes, partition laws "are unquestionably the judicial 
method by which most heir property is lost." 214 
Heir property is just co-owned property arguably rendered 
ungovernable because of repeated rounds of intestate succession-a 
particular issue for Southern rural black landowners with "superstitions 
about making wills," 215 but no desire to have their family farmland broken 
up or sold. In general, when a landowner dies intestate (that is, without a. 
will), the heirs at law receive fractional undivided interests in the land. For 
example, each of John Brown's nine children received a I/9th undivided 
interest in the eighty acres. Often, this first generation of heirs successfully 
manages their parents' property, but second and third generations multiply 
quickly and prove less and less able collectively to cope.216 
Over time, practical problems become unresolvable. Under the 
American law of co-ownership, unless fractional owners unanimously 
consent, the underlying land cannot be managed in any useful way; nor can 
it be mortgaged; nor can any discrete fraction of the land be sold. Without 
effective democratic self-governance mechanisms for co-owned property, 
" [h]eir property is rarely improved or developed, due to the threat of 
partition sales and the difficulty of obtaining credit on partial interests in the 
property. 'In fact, a third more heir than non-heir property is not being used 
at all."' 217 Thus, " [t]he sale of the land, usually precipitated by an heir who 
is more than one generation removed from the originating source, becomes 
inevitable." 218 
3. Community-Destroying Exit 
What are the paths that lead to the end of black landownership? First, as 
with the Brown example, resident heirs may bring suit to quiet title 
21 I. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 282; see, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 203, at 4-7. 
212. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 62. 
213. Ward Sinclair, Black Farmers: A Dying Mirwrity, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1986, at Al. 
214. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 282. 
215. Joseph Brooks, The Emergency Land Fund: A Rural Land Retention and Development 
Model, in THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER-ENDANGERED SPECIES 117, 121 (Leo McGee & 
Robert Boone eds., 1979). 
216. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 282-83. See generally BROWNE, supra note 3, at 54 
(describing the obstacles to effective governance created by the multiplying number of owners as 
land passes through several generations). Governance difficulties are compounded because 
identifying heirs with legal interests becomes a more complex and expensive project with each 
passing generation. Id. 
217. BLACK FARMING, supra note 1, at 68 (quoting HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 75). 
218. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 282-83. 
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intending to acquire ownership in severalty of part of the farm.219 By 
seeking a partition in kind, these heirs express their preference to stay on 
the land and to gain access to mortgages and other ordinary incidents of 
sole private ownership.220 Despite the heirs' request, and the law's nominal 
preference for partition in kind, courts usually order a partition sale because 
the number of heirs and limited size of the property make physical division 
impracticable.221 The second, more sinister, path to partition sales originates 
with nonresident heirs. A non-family-member may acquire a distant 
nonresident heir's fractional share in a family farm specifically for the 
purpose of forcing a partition sale at which the outsider can buy the whole 
tract.222 Because heir property is very common among rural blacks, "the 
black community is particularly vulnerable to the unscrupulous partition 
sale brought about by someone buying out the interest of a single heir and 
then demanding that the land be sold." 223 
Partition sales, like foreclosure and tax sales, prove to be poor, often 
rigged markets with little information and few buyers: "[T]he purchaser[s] 
at these [partition and] tax sales are almost always white persons, frequently 
local lawyers or relatives of the local officials, who make it their business to 
keep abreast of what properties are going to auction and who attend the 
auctions prepared to buy." 224 Given wealth disparities, widespread 
discrimination in access to credit for rural black households, and the 
ordinary imperfections of these rural auctions, partition sales in practice 
mean the transfer of the land from resident black heirs with fractional 
interests to white purchasers who often pay below market value and pay 
nothing for the farm's intangible value in preserving family cohesion.225 
Farming, from all reports, is a chancy business. If cashing out simply 
improves blacks' overall position and consolidates economically obsolete 
219. See BROWNE, supra note 3, at 54. 
220. As an aside, filing suit often turns ·out to be a significant strategic error based on the 
mistaken belief held by most southern rural black landowners (according to surveys) that "an heir's 
interest cannot be sold without the consent of all the heirs, and that heirs in possession of the land 
have superior rights to the land." BLACK FARMING, supra note l, at 69 (reporting a survey of black 
landowners). 
221. Even when partition in kind is possible and perhaps even practical, courts favor partition 
sales. See RICHARD R POWELL, PoWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 'I[ 612 (Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. 
Rohan eds., abr. ed. 1968). 
222. See BROWNE, supra note 3, at 55. 
223. Brooks, supra note 215, at 121. 
224. See BROWNE, supra note 3, at 53. Indeed, these bidders may well be the people who 
induced the action for partition. Id. at 55 ("A variation of this procedure, where the white man 
instigates the partition after having gained a small interest, has been used, especially in the past, to 
gain black-owned land."). 
225. Criticizing the prevalence of forced partition sales, one note argues that judges have 
"misapplied the statutes and allowed private interests to use the statutory process as a land 
acquisition tool at the expense of cotenant landowners." John G. Casagrande, Jr., Note, Acquiring 
Property Through Forced Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. REV. 755, 772 
(1986). 
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farms,226 then the decline in black landownership may not be a serious 
problem, notwithstanding the congressional studies227 and private 
initiatives228 concerned with halting this trend. However, declining black 
landownership also can be traced in part, perhaps, to the difficulty of 
governing fractionated land, resulting in partition sales initiated either by 
resident heirs seeking to improve land management or by nonresident heirs 
and their purchasers seeking to acquire the whole farm at bargain prices.229 
The hostility of American law toward co-ownership appears to impose 
several costs, not only on individual black families, but perhaps on farm 
communities more broadly.230 
Landownership provides benefits other than just farm income. 
Commoners may prefer not to sell because they identify alternative 
economic uses or they place a high subjective value on keeping the land in 
the family. For example, one study of a rural North Carolina community 
showed how landownership provides reciprocal benefits within black 
families: Older owners can obligate children by allowing them to settle on 
the land, and the children then provide support for the elderly landowner in 
this residential enclave.231 By contrast, the study notes, landless elderly 
people are less likely to be able to mobilize informal support and more 
likely to suffer lower living standards.232 Along with simple economic 
reasons, there may also be cognitive framing issues for sales: A farm might 
stay in the family because the family would not be "willing to accept" the 
market price, but if forced to bid at auction, that same family might only be 
226. In 1982, the average commercial black-owned farm in the South was 128 acres, while 
the average white-owned farm was 428 acres. BLACK FARMING, supra note I, at 50. "Economies 
of scale, research and technology, tax benefits, government price and income supports, and 
commercial lending all militate against the survival of black-operated small farms." Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
227. E.g., Housing and Community Development Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92 Stat. 
2080 (1978); BLACK FARMING, supra note 1. 
228. The most significant private initiative is the Emergency Land Fund, a private, nonprofit 
organization founded in 1971 to counter black land loss. See Brooks, supra note 215, at 117. 
229. There are incentives outside of property law that also encourage partition. For example, 
attorney fee structures often award lawyers 10% of the land value on partition sale, but not if the 
title problem is informally resolved. There are many stories of lawyers who have initiated 
partition suits for heirs over the objection of the heirs' families. In one case, a New .York heir 
asked her lawyer to provide deeds to the family property, but the lawyer instead filed an action for 
sale and partition. When the heir fired the lawyer, the lawyer then found another heir to prosecute 
the suit. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 292-93. Also, the tax system encourages partition 
sales by favoring wealthy investors who can write off certain losses in ways not available to low-
or moderate-income farmers. See BLACK FARMING, supra note l, at 4. 
230. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, Jr., Black Rural Land Decline and Political Power, in THE 
BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER-ENDANGERED SPEOES, supra note 215, at 83, 93 ("The absence of a 
viable equity base has been costly to the black community both economically and politically. Black 
dependency on white economic support has served to rob the black community of its autonomous 
decision-making potential."). 
231. Lisa Groger, Tied to Each Other Through Ties to the Land: Informal Suppon of Black 
Elders in a Southern U.S. Community, 7 J. CROSS-CULTURAL GERONTOLOGY 205, 205, 210 (1992). 
232. Id. at 205, 217; cf Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent 
Community in ihe Post-Shaw Era, 49 VAND. L. REV. 227, 243 n.56 (1996) (discussing varying 
levels of ability of landless elders to mobilize informal support). 
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"willing to pay" a lower amount and would thus lose the farm.233 Finally, 
when commoners do decide to sell nonviable farms, they get only distressed 
prices for individual share sales or at partition auctions. They could do 
better by marketing the property cooperatively, but if the law facilitated 
cooperation, then they might not want to sell in the first instance.234 
We cannot know how much of the sharp decline of black 
landownership should be attributed to race and class discrimination, or to 
market forces that make small farms not economically viable. Encouraging 
and enabling black farmers to write wills and improving the integrity of 
partition auctions may have ameliorated the decline to an extent. It seems 
plausible, however, that, at least on the margin, some of this decline might 
have resulted from a particular default legal regime that does not support 
commons ownership and instead actively undermines any possibility for its 
success, even when the family deeply desires to continue working together, 
to keep land in the family, and to give family members a fair share when 
they leave. 
B. How Law Can Dissolve Tragic Choice 
The American law of co-ownership shrinks from any attempt to 
facilitate management of co-owned resources. Instead, by providing 
incentives for mismanagement, the default rules of the common law make 
the continuing existence of a commons a risky enterprise for commoners 
(technically, usually cotenants).235 Over time and in many ways, the 
American law of co-ownership dilutes the value of interests in commons 
ownership, making them less and less usable for the commoners. 
Combined, the rules promote underuse, overuse, and underinvestment-
anything but the actions of an ordinary sole owner managing his or her own 
233. This phenomenon of cogmtJ.ve psychology was hypothesized by Mark Kelman, 
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 669 (1979). Later studies confirmed the effect. Loss aversion may at least partially explain 
this difference. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251, S258 (1986). 
234. Perhaps locking people together by preventing alienation, the no-exit illiberal solution, 
would have kept more farms within the family. But such a solution, even if it achieved 
community-preserving goals, would still be tragic, because it sacrifices each heir's liberty to exit. 
Further, we question whether preventing alienability would necessarily achieve even instrumental 
community-building goals. Consider the disastrous consequences of the federal allotment policy 
for Native Americans that locked people together without providing effective internal self-
govemance mechanisms. See Heller, supra note 56, at 1213-17 (discussing the tragedy of the 
anticommons resulting from these policies). 
235. Cotenants are those who share land under the common-law regime of tenancy in 
common. Each individual tenant has an interest in the same undivided piece of property. Unlike 
joint tenants, cotenants have no right of survivorship. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 11, 
at 322. In all states where it existed, the presumption in favor of joint tenancy has been abolished 
almost completely, id. at 323, so, on death and in the absence of a will, heirs hold property as 
tenants in common. Abolishing the presumption of joint tenancy thus may have had the 
unintended effect of accelerating fractionation. 
610 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 549 
property. Given the penalty default legal regime of the common law, the 
tragedy of the commons turns out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
By contrast, Continental legal regimes do a better job of supporting the 
goals of a liberal commons, although some fall short in significant ways. 
Legal regimes that descend more from the French side of the tradition 
(France and Belgium) diverge in a few places from those on the German 
side (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and in this context, Israel236). One of 
these divergences-the requirement of unanimity in democratic self-
governance-makes the French tradition significantly less supportive of the 
liberal commons than its Germanic counterpart. But viewed broadly, 
Continental legal systems possess most of the features we identified as 
supporting the liberal commons: facilitating the flourishing of the common 
use of property while still allowing meaningful exit. Even those Continental 
legal systems of the French tradition that carry the uncomfortable baggage 
of unanimity (creating the conditions for anticommons tragedy) are still 
considerably more supportive of liberal commons values than the American 
law. Recently, England, America's common-law parent, passed a law 
reform that significantly aligns its law with liberal commons goals. 237 
The differences between the American and Continental laws of co-
ownership are quite tedious. But, over time, it is the collective impact of 
just those tedious details that helps shape the norms of communities of co-
owners, and tilts co-owners' attempts to cooperate toward success or 
failure. Whether something more like the Continental law would have made 
a difference for the black landowner is difficult to gauge in retrospect, as 
we mentioned earlier. Perhaps it would not have. And no single change 
would likely have made any difference. The decline may have been 
overdetermined, with racism in lending and changes in technology dwarfing 
subtle changes in the formal law. There is no way now to tease out the 
causal links between formal law and the informal norms and practices 
among black farm families and surrounding communities. 
Nevertheless, the possibility that European farm families can now stay 
more easily on their land when family members depart suggests at least a 
236. In many respects, Israel is usually considered a common-law jurisdiction. But the Israeli 
Land Law is part of a codification that was heavily influenced by the Continental tradition. See 
Y oram Shachar, History and Sources of Israeli Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 1, 
5-6 (Amos Shapira & Karen C. DeWitt-Arareds., 1995). 
237. The reason for the traditional common-law hostility towards co-ownership is somewhat 
of a puzzle, especially if we are correct in our claim that co-ownership is not an institution that 
necessarily fails. One possibility is that an outdated hostility toward feudal forms drove the 
development of co-ownership law. Consider W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN 
LAW & COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 106 (2d ed. 1952), which states: 
The inconvenience of common ownership was so great that a power of division was from 
early times inherent in the institution .... The contrary rule of our earlier law, till Henry 
VIII, under which no partition could be compelled (except as between coparceners, who 
became joint owners by operation of law, so that the position was not voluntarily 
assumed), rests, no doubt, in reality more on the interest of the chief lord in having the 
services undivided than on this ground .... 
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testable proposition.238 Perhaps the formal law matters occasionally even in 
rural farm communities and operates as the liberal commons theory 
predicts. Whether German farm families respond to supportive co-
ownership law (or whether regression modeling would point wholly to 
government price supports239) then becomes an interesting question for 
fieldwork and empirical testing. For emerging and "new economy" 
resources today, perhaps a default co-ownership law supportive of liberal 
commons goals could be even more important in catalyzing a virtuous 
circle of trust and cooperation. 
1. The Sphere of Individual Dominion 
a. American Law 
The common law facilitates a race to overuse-the classic image of a 
tragedy of the commons. Each commoner is entitled to full possession and, 
more importantly, in most states, the commoner can possess and use the 
commons without paying any rental value to the nonpossessors240 (so long 
as the nonpossessors are not excluded or ousted from possession241). These 
rules provide an incentive for overuse because each commoner must make 
affirmative uses, or else receive no rents from the resource.242 
In the farm context, the common-law incentives for underinvestment 
are probably much more salient. As an initial matter, the law is relatively 
receptive to claims for accounting or contribution for payments of taxes, 
238. In some circumstances, family farms can be a rather efficient scale of agricultural 
production. See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 141-42 (1996) 
(contrasting the success of family farms with the failure of vertically organized agricultural 
cooperatives). 
239. See, e.g., Alison Maitland, Shrewd Farmers See the Way the Wind Is Blowing, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 17, 1998, at 2 (discussing Gennan farmers' support for extensive price subsidies). 
240. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 6.14, at 57 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); DUKEMINIER 
& KRIER, supra note 11. at 351; W.W. Allen, Annotation, Accountability of Cotenantsfor Rents and 
Profits or Use and Occupation, 51 A.L.R.2d 388, 395 (1957). There are, however, jurisdictions that 
have adopted other rules. For example, some jurisdictions have statutes or common law that 
specifically require tenants in possession to compensate nonpossessory commoners for the value of 
possession, usually calculated as the nonpossessing tenant's proportionate share of rent, as if the 
property were rented to a third party. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 
§ 5.8, at 214 & n.22 (2d ed. 1993); Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and 
Outs of Cotenant Possession Value liability and a Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 
331, 351. Other jurisdictions hold the duty to account applicable whenever a" cotenant derives any 
income from the sole possession of the property in the form of rents or otherwise." CUNNINGHAM ET 
AL., supra,§ 5.8, at213-14. 
241. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 240, § 5.8, at 211-12. 
242. In theory, but not in practice, the law of waste might penalize a cotenant for overuse, such 
as clear-cutting timber from property today if the timber would be more valuable in later years. 
While the law of waste is designed to avoid property use that fails to maximize the property's value, 
see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73 (4th ed. 1992), the law is sufficiently 
confused and the penalties sufficiently light that overuse is encouraged, CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra 
note 240, § 5.8, at 214-15. Courts are divided over the question of whether cutting timber or drilling 
for oil constitutes waste (activities that the law may well want to encourage on the appropriate scale). 
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.15, at 65-66. 
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mortgages, and other necessary charges made by one commoner on behalf 
of the others.243 But if one commoner makes necessary repairs without the 
others' consent, most courts are much less forthcoming, allowing the 
investing commoner to receive contribution only at partition, or through a 
setoff in the (rare) case where a court requires an investing commoner to 
account for rents and profits.244 This rule has been rationalized as necessary 
because questions "of how much should be expended on repairs, their 
character and extent, and whether as a matter of business judgment such 
expenditures are justified" are too uncertain for the law to settle. 245 Thus, 
commoners who make repairs take a significant risk that they will not be 
reimbursed; alternatively, they are led to partition as the only available 
avenue to recoup their investment expenditures.246 
243. 2 AMERICAN LA w OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.17' at 73-74; DUKEMJNIER & KRIER, 
supra note 11, at 359. Some jurisdictions, however, have adopted a rule that if the tenant who paid 
taxes is in possession and the value of his or her use and enjoyment equals or exceeds such payment, 
then there is no cause of action for contribution. 2 ·AMERICAN LA w OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, 
§ 6.17, at 76; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 11, at 359. This modification, however, is itself not 
unifonnly applied. See Allen, supra note 240, § 19. 
244. On the complex, conflicting, and multifarious approaches to cotenants and repairs, consult 
2 AMERICAN LA w OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.18, at 77-80; CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 
240, § 5.9, at 215-16; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 11, at 359; 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE 
LAW OF REsTmmON § 10.7, at 430 (1978); Berger, supra note 160, at 1019-20; and John P. 
Dawson, The Self-Serving lntermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1422-24 (1974). 
It may appear at first sight that the doctrine of ouster provides a background rule of strict 
accounting. An action for ejectment restores possession to an ousted plaintiff and awards the 
plaintiff mesne profits, with an offset for necessary repairs (and perhaps some improvements, if 
profits are attributable to them). CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 240, § 5.8, at 212, 214. Ouster, 
however, requires an express denial of another cotenant' s right to entry and possession. The 
doctrine provides no remedy for a cotenant who is in possession or who is voluntarily not in 
possession. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.13, at 52-54; CUNNINGHAM ET 
AL., supra note 240, § 5.8, at 211. Furthermore, there is a presumption that one cotenant' s 
possession (even if it is sole possession) is not adverse to other cotenants' possession. 7 POWELL, 
supra note 221, 'j[ 612, § 50.03(2); Allen, supra note 240, § 13, at 437. Thus, ouster doctrine 
provides some recourse only in a limited set of circumstances and may be costly or difficult to 
prove even then. 
245. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.18, at 78. 
246. To complete the picture, we should mention the common-law rules regarding 
improvements. Cotenants who make improvements on the property are generally unable to bring 
an action for contribution, nor are they credited the cost of the improvement in an accounting for 
rents and profits. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.18, at 81; Dawson, supra 
note 244, at 1424. The only recourse available for tenants to recover their investment is partition. 
Dawson, supra note 244, at 1425; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 11, at 360 
(discussing improvements). Nevertheless, even with partition, the valuation of improvements 
discourages such expenditures. The majority rule is that improving cotenants are entitled to the 
lesser of the cost of the improvement or the additional increase in property value. See 2 PALMER, 
supra note 244, § 10.7, at 429-30. Contra 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, 
§ 6.18, at 83-84 (stating that improvers are entitled to the increase in value but that the cost of 
improvements is irrelevant). Some courts even say that credits for improvements can only offset 
additional moneys owed and cannot be a source of income. Dawson, supra note 244, at 1425-26 
& n.48. 
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b. Comparative Perspective 
The Continental traditions have desirable rules for discouraging both 
overuse and underinvestment. For example, to avoid overuse, Israel makes 
the user liable to the other co-owners for the cost of use.247 Further, 
countries in the Continental traditions distribute the net fruits and revenues 
of the property on the basis of the commoners' shares in the property, thus 
helping both to discourage overuse and to inculcate a sense of community 
among the commoners.248 
Likewise, Germany and Israel require immediate reimbursement for 
expenses reasonably required for maintenance and management of the 
commons resource, while denying compensation for improvements (whose 
value is less clearly shared by all commoners).249 This relatively broad 
provision for immediate reimbursement for noncontestable (reasonable) 
collective goods bestowed upon the land discourages the sort of 
underinvestment that can make commons ownership inefficient. 
Furthermore, such a regime of instantaneous contribution assumes that 
dissolution is not a satisfying first or best solution but should be, indeed, a 
solution of last resort. 250 
247. For Israel, see Israel Land Law § 33, 1959, 23 L.S.I. 288 (1968-1969); consider also the 
Louisiana Civil Code, LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 806 (West Supp. 2000). 
248. Section 35 of the Israeli Land Law provides, "Every joint owner is entitled to a share in 
the proceeds of the joint property in accordance with his share in the property." In the Yotzer case, 
the court declined to give this passage a narrowing interpretation that would have applied it only 
to situations in which the proceeds were created through no particular owner's labor, or even to 
adopt our complex intermediate approach. C.A. 274/82, Yotzer v. Yotzer, 39(1) P.D. 53, 55-56 
(lsr.). For similar rules in Germany and Austria, see § 839 ALLGEMEINES BORGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH [ABGB] (Aus.); §743 Nr. 1 BORGERLiCHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] (F.R.G.); Gerd-
Hinrich Langhein, [Commentary], in J. VON STUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN 
GESETZBUCH 126-27 (Norbert Hom ed., 13th ed. 1996); and Karsten Schmidt, [Commentary], in 
MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH §§ 743-47 (Peter Ulmer ed., 3d 
ed. 1997). Thus, these countries use the second of the three plausible rules for sharing fruits and 
revenues we discuss supra at text accompanying note 159. In a unique case, a German court 
allocated 100% of the profits from advertising to one co-owner of a gable wall who had allowed 
his side of the wall to be used for these purposes. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in 
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 43, 127 (133-34). This outcome has been explained by the 
fact that, although a gable wall is jointly owned, each side is intended to be used exclusively by 
one owner. See Langbein, supra, at 127. 
249. For Germany, see § 748 BGB, translated in THE GERMAN C!VII.. CODE 122 (Ian S. 
Forrester et al., trans., 1975), which states, "Each participant is bound as against the other 
participants to bear the burdens of the common object and the costs of maintenance, management, 
and common use in proportion to his share." See also Langbein, supra note 248, at 219 (indicating 
that there is no compensation for improvements). This rule also holds in Israel. See Israel Land Law 
§ 32. Interestingly, Swiss law, which generally follows the German Continental tradition, seems 
more like American law in this respect, granting the co-owner only the right to "take on his own the 
necessary steps which have to be taken without loss of time in order to preserve the object from 
imminent or increasing damage." SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] art. 647 (Switz.). 
250. The Continental tradition also prohibits individuals from making use of the resource in a 
manner that interferes with the reasonable use of other co-owners. See § 828 ABGB (Aus.); CODE 
CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 815-9 (Fr.); § 743 Nr. 2 BOB (F.R.G.); Israel Land Law § 31(a)(l); see also 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 802. These codes employ flexible guidelines to restrict use to what may 
reasonably be expected by other commoners, typically by reference to the nature of the property 
and its previous uses. Of course, state law in the United States, apart from Louisiana, and the law 
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2. The Sphere of Democratic Self-Governance 
a. American Law 
As one commentator aptly notes, "cotenant conflicts are for the most 
part hidden dramas." 251 Co-owned property in the American common law is 
governed by a rule of unanimity: Each commoner has veto power over the 
decisions of the other commoners regarding property management. A 
leading text notes that "[i]f the cotenants cannot agree neither law nor 
equity can settle such differences; nor can they specifically settle how the 
property shall be used and enjoyed. The law's remedy in all such cases is 
partition . . . . " 252 For example, if differences arise among commoners about 
whether to enter jointly into a transaction such as borrowing money against 
the property or leasing it to outsiders, the law does not provide any 
guidance or facilitation. Absent partition, the veto power each commoner 
enjoys leads to a tragedy of the anticommons, with wasteful underuse and 
eventual division, as suggested by the black landownership saga. 
Given these doctrines, it is unsurprising that "[m]ost lending 
institutions will not lend money on a partial interest in real property, even if 
the exact amount of the partial interest is known." 253 Thus, a commoner 
cannot get a mortgage on an individual fractional interest; and for groups, 
unanimity rules prevent commoners from easily combining to get a 
mortgage on the whole. Without access to financing-because of a missing 
market-the sum of the parts proves less than the value of the whole and 
commoners face a significant additional incentive to partition the land by 
sale. 
of other regimes that we generally consider less supportive of.liberal commons goals, also prohibit 
such interfering use. The salient difference in this area comes in the details of how this prohibition 
is implemented. Of particular importance is the rule adopted when joint use is impossible or 
unreasonable. In such a situation, where similar use by both would be impossible, can one party 
then use the property to the exclusion of the other? As we have shown, American law allows such 
use, encouraging the parties to enter into a strategic game where each seeks to be the one allowed 
to exclude the others, behavior inconsistent with the idea of productive cooperation. Forbidding 
such use, on the other hand, encourages the parties to reach a cooperative and efficient solution 
(such as a rental to a third party). Providing an incentive for such a solution is the supportive 
approach to encouraging a liberal commons. German law provides just such a supportive 
approach: Use by one owner is allowed only when it does not interfere with the use of other 
owners. Langbein, supra note 248, at 135. If joint use is impossible, the disposition of the 
property must be determined by the agreement of all of the commoners; if this is impossible, 
a majority vote may determine the use of the property, and compensation for the benefits of 
this use must be paid to the nonusing owners. § 745 BGB. Swiss law is similar in this regard. 
ARTHUR MEIER-HAYOZ, Das Eigentum [Propeny Rights], in 4 BERNER KOMMENTAR: DAS 
SACHENRECHT 447-50 (1966) (discussing the Swiss provision). Israeli law is unsettled on this 
matter, with Justice Ben-Porat favoring the unsupportive American approach and Justice 
Netanyahu favoring the more supportive rule. C.A. 458/82, Vilner v. Golani, 42( 1) P.D. 49 (Isr.). 
251. Lewis, supra note 240, at 341. 
252. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.18, at 78. 
253. HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 203, at 306. 
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b. Comparative Perspective 
Focusing on the Germanic legal regimes, at the supportive end of the 
Continental spectrum, we can see that the most important way they support 
the liberal commons, by contrast with the American common law, is by 
granting a wide jurisdiction for majority rule in the sphere of self-
governance and reserving a relatively small sphere for unanimity.254 
However, the threshold that German tradition sets between majority rule 
and unanimity is more restrictive than the threshold our theoretical 
discussion would suggest. We recommended that majority rule be available 
for decisions that tend to increase the size of the pie and unanimity ought to 
be required when decisions merely redistribute within a same-sized pie. 
Instead, Germanic legal systems draw the distinction based on the 
expectations of the parties. Majority rule is allowed when the decisions do 
not change the parties' expectations for how the property will be used; 
unanimity is required for decisions that depart significantly from these 
expectations.255 
One may speculate that this rule is based on the concern about the risk 
of court errors in complicated disputes as to the utility of conflicting uses. 
We appreciate this concern. Nevertheless, we believe that adopting such a 
conservative attitude toward the scope of majority rule may suffocate the 
ability of the commons to adapt and grow with changing times. 
Interestingly enough, Swiss law incorporates our approach into the 
254. Not all Continental legal traditions have adopted this supportive rule: In general, those 
countries that are more closely related to German law have majority rule, while the legal traditions 
more closely related to France share the less desirable American requirement of unanimity. CODE 
CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 577bis § 6 (Belg.); C. CIV. art. 815-3 (Fr.); see also LA. CN. CODE ANN. arts. 
801, 803 (requiring unanimity for decisions regarding use and management, except that, in the 
absence of agreement, a court may make de~isions upon petition by a co-owner); Symeon C. 
Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 TUL. L. 
REV. 69, 130 (1993) (identifying partition as the solution where unanimity cannot be reached). 
255. German law itself allows for majority rule for decisions "corresponding to the character 
of the common object," but requires unanimity for "essential alteration[s) of the object." § 745 
BOB. Israeli law is essentially the same. Israel Land Law § 30(a) (stating that majority rule is 
sufficient for" all matters relating to the ordinary management and use"); id. § 30(c) (stating that 
unanimity is required for "any matter outside the scope of ordinary management and use"); C.A. 
810/82, Zol Bo Ltd. v. Zeida, 37(4) P.D. 737 (Isr.). Austrian and Swiss. law, with minor 
alterations, have the same system. § 833 ABGB (Aus.) (stating that majority rule is sufficient for 
ordinary management and use); id. §§ 834-35 (stating that in the absence of unanimity for 
significant alterations, dissenters may make specific demands or refer the matter to a judge); ZGB 
arts. 647a, 647b, 647d (Switz.) (stating that majority rule is sufficient for most administrative acts, 
useful and necessary repairs); id. art. 647e (stating that unanimity is required for improvements 
merely to improve beauty or comfort). As an aside, other legal systems influenced by the German 
tradition also provide for majority rule in approximately these situations. E.g., SBIRKA ZAKONU 
[SB.] art. 139 (Czech Rep.) (stating that majority rule is sufficient for all decisions with the ability 
to appeal to the court to reconsider important decisions); ASTIKOS KODIX arts. 789, 792-93 
(Greece); POLGARI TORVENYKONYV [PTK.] arts. 140, 144 (Hung.) (specifying majority rule for 
issues "not exceeding standard measures," but unanimity for others); CODICE CIVILE arts. 1105-
06, 1108 (Italy); MINPC arts. 251, 252 (Japan) (specifying majority by value for acts of 
administration, but unanimity for alterations). 
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expectations-based test by closely scrutinizing the distribution of the 
benefits of such majority decisions.256 
Procedural norms of democratic self-governance also distinguish 
relatively supportive Continental traditions for liberal commons property 
regimes from the less supportive American law.257 Both jurisdictional and 
procedural norms help make participation in systems of majority 
governance more meaningful. 
3. The Sphere of Cooperation-Enhancing Exit 
a. American Law 
How to manage the freedom to exit poses a challenge for the liberal 
commons. In this sphere, the American and Continental laws overlap 
substantially, with a mixed record and few cooperation-enhancing 
mechanisms. For example, both have similar provisions regarding restraints 
on alienation of co-owned interests and on the choice between partition by 
sale and partition in kind. In American law, the limited mechanisms for 
cooperation-enhancing exit must be voluntarily agreed upon in advance by 
the co-owners. For example, agreements by co-owners not to partition are 
generally enforceable so long as they do not amount to a restraint on 
alienation and remain in force only for a reasonable time (which can turn 
out to be quite a long period, indeed).258 On the other hand, American law 
disfavors agreements to restrain the sale of co-ownership interests,259 so co-
owners are, in general, unable to block sales to outsiders. 
Partition is the dominant exit mechanism.260 Nominally, partition in 
kind is the preferred common law method,261 but it is complex to implement 
256. For instance, if the agreed-upon alteration requires an unfair contribution by one 
commoner (for example, paying lf4, but getting I/LO of the value) who voted against the 
contribution, then that commoner must be compensated. ZGB art. 647d(3). 
257. Germany provides each co-owner a right to "adequate" participation in the decision-
making process, which includes access to adequate information and a right that each co-owner's 
opinion be adequately taken into account.§ 744 Nr. 1 BGB; Langbein, supra note 248, at 163-64; 
Schmidt, supra note 248, §§ 744, 745 'll'Jl 14-17. In Israel, there are requirements of disclosure and 
consultation, 'Zol Bo Ltd., 37(4) P.D. 737, as well as requirements that parties approach the 
consultation open to suggestions. Violations of these requirements void the majority decision. 
C.A. 458/82, Vilner v. Golani, 42(1) P.D. 49 (Isr.). 
258. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.26, at 116; CRIBBET & JOHNSON, 
supra note 200, at l 14; WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 
216-17 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that a reasonable time is typically defined as being a time within the 
period of the rule against perpetuities). The waivability of the right to call for partition proves to 
be one of the central features that distinguishes co-ownership from condominium law in general. 
Unlike co-ownership, condominium statutes or agreements prohibit action by unit owners to 
compel partition of the co-owned elements, so exit is by sale of the unit only. See STOEBUCK & 
WHITMAN, supra, at 181, 217. 
259. STOEBUCK& WHITMAN, supra note 258, at 178 & n.19. 
260. But it was not during the earliest days of the tenancy in common form. CRIBBET & 
JOHNSON, supra note 200, at 127 (noting that at early common law, only coparceners, but not 
cotenants, had the right to demand partition). 
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when co-owners cannot agree voluntarily on division. To even out the share 
values, courts impose equitable adjustments, such as payments of" owelty" 
or easements among the new parcels.262 Physical division often proves 
impossible for a minority of the commoners or significantly diminishes the 
value of their shares. In most cases now, partition is by sale, with the 
proceeds distributed pro rata according to ownership shares.263 However, as 
we have shown, auction sales often result in opportunistic exploitation by 
one commoner, because the auctions are such poor markets. While the 
choice between partition in kind and by sale may be complex-driven by 
"personhood" 264 or utilitarian concerns-neither seems well-tailored by 
itself to achieving cooperation-enhancing exit. 
Some reforms have been attempted. For example, Alabama passed a 
statute that gave co-owners the right to purchase the interests of the co-
owner who petitioned for partition (but this provision was struck down in 
1985).265 Other states allow courts to order a partial partition, thus 
respecting the desires of those who wish to remain in cotenancy.266 Both of 
these reforms seem to us to be aimed at ameliorating the community-
destroying effect of the current law of partition.267 But the reforming states 
are not careful enough about the distributive effects of the reforms. The 
former reform offers an even thinner market than auction sales do. The 
latter-the procedure of "partial partition" -is also problematic. Allowing 
a subset of the commoners to carve out a share by physical division absent 
general consent is likely to injure the remaining commoners who may be 
left with a larger share of a smaller and less valuable piece of property. 
261. Ashley v. Baker, 867 P.2d 792, 796 (Alaska 1994) (placing financial interests of co-owners 
at the center of the decision whether to partition by sale or in kind); Von Behren v. Oberg, 902 
S.W.2d 338, 340-41 (Mo. 1995) (analyzing the financial interests of parties in partition actions); 2 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 240, § 6.26, at 114; Candace Reid, Note, Partitions in 
Kind: A Preference Without Favor, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 855, 856 (1986). 
262. Eli v. Eli, 557 N.W.2d 405, 408-11 (S.D. 1997) (remanding for the application of rules of 
owelty and creation of easements to ensure equitable partition in kind); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, 
supra note 258, at 215 (defining owelty). 
263. 7 PoWELL, supra note 221, 'lI 612; STOEBUCK& WHITMAN, supra note 258, at 221-24. 
264. See generally DAGAN, supra note 140, at 41-47 (discussing theories of personhood, 
resources, and property); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REIN1ERPRETING PROPERTY 35 (1993) 
(discussing personhood and property); WALDRON, supra note 13, at 343-89 (discussing theories of 
property and personhood). In the recent case of Eli, the court noted that partition in kind should 
trump monetary considerations, especially when "the land in question has descended from 
generation to generation." 557 N. W.2d at 410. 
265. ALA. CODE§ 35-6-100 (1975); Jolly v. Knopf, 463 So. 2d 150, 153 (Ala. 1985) (holding 
that the statute violated the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions). 
266. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE§ 6-509 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-16 (1999); TENN. 
CODE ANN.§ 29-27-104 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-39-9 (1996). 
267. Cases construing the Alabama right-of-first-refusal statute, however, often articulated its 
purpose to be the protection of a co-owner against involuntary divestment of her property interest; 
thus these courts seemed to focus attention on the liberal rather than the cooperation interest of 
remaining co-owners. See, e.g., Williams v. Mcintyre, 632 So. 2d 446, 449 (Ala. 1993); Jolly, 463 
So. 2d at 153; Black v. McCorvey, 428 So. 2d 607, 608 (Ala. 1983); Ragland v. Walker, 387 So. 
2d 184, 185 (Ala. 1980). 
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Hence, both reforms may exacerbate the potential minority oppression of 
current law and thus paradoxically undermine cooperation. 
Perhaps one direction for a more successful reform would be to give 
commoners supporting and opposing partition a period of time to secure a 
sale on the open market, with the partition auction as a backstop. Or, in a 
solution adapted from the law of condominium associations, co-owners 
who wish to remain on the land following an auction could be given limited 
rights of first refusal (also called preemption rights).268 
b. Comparative Perspective 
The countries in the Continental tradition generally provide for the right 
both to alienate one's share in the property and to call for partition of it.269 
Commons success is enhanced, however, by allowing a cooling-off period, 
namely, by enforcing party agreements that restrain exit (both in the sense 
of alienation of one's share and also in the sense of partition) for a limited 
time period. This cooling-off period is generally accomplished by declaring 
the complete invalidity of agreements to restrain alienation that exceed a 
certain number of years, or by subjecting the restraint after a limited period 
of time to the broad discretion of the court. 270 
Some provisions of the Germanic systems relating to agreements to 
restrain exit go too far, in our view, in supporting the flourishing of the 
commons, threatening the liberal premises upon which desirable commons 
regimes are based. For instance, German law allows agreements to restrain 
alienation of one's share to last perpetually, not mitigated by the authority 
268. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 200, at 130 (discussing rights of first refusal as a 
mechanism to give condominium owners a voice in selecting their neighbors); SroEBUCK & 
WHITMAN, supra note 258, at 123-24, 182, 203 (discussing rights of first refusal for condominium 
associations). 
269. See, e.g., ABGB art. 829 (Aus.) (alienation); id. art. 830 (partition); C. CIV. art. 815 (Belg.) 
(partition); C. CIV. art. 815 (Fr.) (partition); § 747 BGB (F.R.G.) (alienation); § 749 Nr. 1 id. 
(partition); Israel Land Law § 34(a), 1959, 23 L.S.I. 288 (1968-1969) (alienation); id. § 37(a) 
(partition); ZGB art. 646(3) (Switz.) (alienation); id. art. 650(1) (partition); see also LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. art. 805 (West Supp. 2000) (alienation). The French law allows for a court-ordered delay of the 
exercise of this right for a maximum of two years if immediate partition would depreciate the value 
of the property. C. CIV. art. 815. If used too frequently, this provision could represent a troubling 
inroad on the availability of exit. Used sparingly, however, and for such a limited period, it may be 
an acceptable compromise between the parties' interests in preserving the value of their property and 
their right to exit. 
Note that countries that did not provide generally for the right to partition without court 
approval are excluded from this comparative discussion. See infra note 275. 
270. In Israel, the time limitation for agreements restraining alienation is five years, Israel 
Land Law§ 34(b), and the time limit on agreements restraining partition is left to the discretion of 
the court-after three years, the court may order partition despite the agreement if the court deems 
it just to do so, Israel Land Law § 37(b). Many Continental regimes limit agreements to restrain 
partition to five years. E.g., C. CIV. art. 815 (Belg.); C. CIV. art. 815 (Fr.). Japan also does so. 
MINPO art. 256. In Louisiana, parties may agree to restrain alienation and partition for a period of 
up to fifteen years. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:1112 (West 1991). 
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of any court to invalidate the agreement,271 as in the case of German 
partition agreements.272 The Swiss law places a thirty-year time limit on the 
validity of agreements to restrain partition, but this time limit is arguably 
excessive.273 The only limit Austria places on agreements to restrain 
partition is termination upon transfer of the property.274 In their desire to 
support commons ownership, some of the countries in this tradition have 
failed to provide adequately for the relatively free exit that is essential to 
the functioning of a liberal commons.275 
How partition is accomplished is also important to support a liberal 
commons. Countries in the Continental tradition use two methods to 
achieve distributive equality. The first is scrupulously fair distribution of 
the value of the property on partition. Like the American law, most favor 
partition in kind (unless this form of division would seriously compromise 
the value of the property distributed to the parties).276 Accordingly, such 
271. § 747 BGB (providing the general right to alienate one's share). This right may not be 
limited by any juristic act.§ 137 c.l id. 
272. German law allows agreements to restrain partition to remain in force indefinitely, 
subject to invalidation by the court for" serious cause." § 749 Nr. 2 BGB. This provision seems to 
contemplate the possibility of permanent agreements to restrain partition in some circumstances. 
§§ 749, 751 id. (referring to the power to exclude "permanently"). Such restrictions potentially 
outlast transfers of the property. § 751 id. Although this criterion at first sounds like it may be too 
great a restraint on exit-a requirement of "serious cause" sounds much more restrictive than the 
broad discretion sometimes placed in courts to invalidate agreements-there is reason to believe 
that it is not, in fact, applied so rigidly in Germany. In particular, counterbalancing the concern 
that such an agreement will unduly burden the parties' ability to exit is the likelihood that a 
restraint on partition that lasts for an "unreasonably" long time, along with other causes that 
approximate concerns about restrictions on exit, will count as sufficient "serious cause." Schmidt, 
supra note 248, § 749 'I 8. Other causes for invalidating these agreements include a violation of 
the minority's procedural rights in decisionmaking or a breakdown in the personal relations of the 
commoners, Langhein, supra note 248, § 745, at 20; Schmidt, supra note 248, § 749 'II l l, and 
hostility among the commoners such that joint use is impossible, BGH [Supreme Court], NJW-
Rechtsprechungs-Report Zivilrecht [NJW-R-RZ], 10 (1995), 334 (335). Conversely, a good 
opportunity to sell the common property is generally not considered a good cause. Schmidt, supra 
note 248, § 749 'JI I I. 
273. ZGB art. 650(2). On this point, Hungary is even more protective of exit, disallowing 
agreements restraining partition altogether. PTK. art. 147. 
274. § 831 ABGB; see also § 832 id. (stating that a third-party disposition of property in 
common can bind the first parties to the disposition, but not their heirs). As an aside, a similar regime 
is in place in India, where agreements in perpetuity are allowed, but they have been held not to bind 
heirs, on the grounds of public policy concerns with alienation of land. SHAMBHUDAS MITRA, 
MITRA'SC0-0WNERSHIPANDPARTITION 173-74 (1994). 
275. There are, of course, much more extreme examples of sacrificing the liberal aspect of 
the liberal commons by creating serious barriers to exit. For instance, several Middle Eastern 
countries do not have an express right to partition. In Iran, partition is not available if it leads to a 
loss in value of the land. QUANUN-1 MADAN! art. 595 (Iran). In Jordan, partition may only be had 
by means of a petition to the court which, presumably, may be rejected. QUANUN AL-MADAN! 
§ 1040 (Jordan). In Nigeria, as well, partition of jointly owned family land-where "family" 
appears to be defined quite broadly-is available only for cause, and, when deciding whether or 
not to partition, the court must consider the best interest of the family as a whole. T.O. ELIAS, 
NIGERIAN LAND LAW 126-27 (1971). 
276. E.g., § 843 ABGB (Aus.); Israel Land Law §§ 39, 40, 1959, 23 L.S.I. 288 (1968-1969); 
ZGB art. 651(2) (Switz.); C.A.1017/97, Ridlevitch v. Moda'i, 52(4) P.D. 625 (Isr.). This is also the 
law in many other countries influenced by this tradition, including several postsocialist systems. SB. 
art. 142 (Czech Rep.); PTK. art. 148 (Hung.); MINPO art. 258 (Japan); GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS 
[GRAZH. K.] art. 218 (Kaz.); BO LUAT DAN SU [BO L.] art. 238 (Vietnam). Interestingly, England 
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countries pay careful attention to ensuring that each party gets a fair share 
using the mechanism of owelty payments.277 A second approach, used by 
Germany, is to limit partition in kind to situations where physical partition 
can lead to identical values going to each owner. Germany provides further 
security against the possibility that the physical portions will be unfairly 
divided by prescribing that after division is made, distribution of the parts is 
made by lot.278 "Partial partition" is allowed only when the commoners 
provide unanimous consent.279 
Our discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of rights of first 
refusal suggested that providing such a right as a default may benefit a 
liberal commons regime. French law provides for a right of first refusal; the 
Germanic countries do not.280 
4. A Final Comparison: The British Tum 
The American law of co-ownership took its lead from the English 
common law.281 So where does England stand? Until recently, the English 
law was uniquely unsupportive of co-owned property.282 Not surprisingly, 
effectively has the reverse presumption: Partition by sale is much easier to effect than partition in 
kind. See infra note 283. 
277. E.g., C. CIV. art. 833 (Belg.); C. CIV. art. 830 (Fr.); Israel Land Law § 39(b); ZGB art. 
651(3) (Switz.). 
278. § 752 BOB. 
279. See Langbein, supra note 248, § 749 'II 53; Schmidt, supra note 248, § 749 'II'lI 25-26. For 
the law in Israel, see C.A. 623nl, Gan-Boaz v. Englander, 27(1) P.D. 334 (Isr.). 
280. C. CIV. arts. 814-15 (Fr.). The right of first refusal is relatively common, and appears, for 
example, in many recent French-influenced civil codes. E.g., ZHONGHUA RENMIN GoNGHEGUO 
FAGUJ HUIBIAN art. 78 (P.R.C.) (allowing "right of preemption if all other conditions are equal"); 
SB. art. 140 (Czech Rep.); GRAni. K. art. 216 (Kaz.); B6 L. art. 237 (Vietnam). 
281. To understand the relevant English law, first note some unique structural features of 
English land law. interests in land are divided into legal interests (strictly speaking, ownership) 
and equitable interests (strictly speaking, various rights of use and control). English law does not 
allow for legal interests to take the form of a "tenancy in common" -the type of commons 
property we are considering here. Law of Property Act (LPA), 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 1(6). It 
does, however, allow for these interests to be held as a joint tenancy, which differs from a tenancy 
in common mainly because of the existence of survivorship rights. E.H. BURN, CHESHIRE AND 
BURN'S MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 225 (15th ed. 1993); KEVIN GRAY, ELEMENTS OF 
LAND LAW 512 (2d ed. 1994); ROBERT MEGARRY & M.P. THOMPSON, MEGARRY'S MANUAL OF 
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 288 (7th ed. 1993). Because of this restriction, all commons 
property technically must be held as equitable interests, and not as legally owned property. 
Because ownership is just a collection of equitable interests-various rights of use and control-
the restriction could have been merely formal, for land registration purposes. One person could 
have owned the legal title but have been made powerless regarding equitable interests, and the co-
owners could have split the equitable rights among themselves, much as they are split in other 
systems. But the formal restriction on legal commons property has had a more profound effect on 
jointly held equitable interests in property. 
282. In the English system, commons property at law is provided for by means of a trust. The 
trustees (no more than four, per the Trustee Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 19, § 34) are empowered to 
make decisions about managing and disposing of the property, but they are bound by various 
requirements of consultation and potential judicial overrides. One of the main reasons for 
requiring that common ownership be in trust was that a small group of trustees was thought more 
able to facilitate alienation of the land than a potentially larger group of common owners. And the 
trust structure did indeed have that effect, particularly regarding alienation. A potential purchaser 
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when the American law of co-ownership was formed, it followed the 
British preference for ending co-ownership rather than supporting its 
continuation, even if the two systems did not use the same technical 
forms. 283 In 1996, however, England passed the Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act, moving England significantly closer to a 
supportive regime. The details are complex, but, in some ways, the English 
law now surpasses its American progeny in supporting the goals of a 
successful liberal commons.284 
Despite these changes, English law still does not go as far as the 
Continental systems. To give one example, immediate contribution is not 
available, even for basic maintenance and other necessary expenses;285 and 
as we have argued, delaying such recovery until dissolution increases 
was not required to investigate all of the interests in common property; she only needed to deal 
with the trustees. MEGARRY & THOMPSON, supra note 281, at 291-92. Before 1996, the trust itself 
was referred to as a "trust for sale" and the trustees were under a statutory duty to sell the 
property at the earliest convenience. Id. at 289. Under the equitable doctrine of conversion, a 
beneficiary was considered to have an interest only in the proceeds of the sale of the co-owned 
property, and not the land itself, as equity regarded as "done that which ought to be done" (in this 
case, sale). Id. at 257. Trustees could postpone sale, but only if they all agreed to do so (even one 
trustee favoring sale was enough to trigger the duty). Id. at 289. Furthermore, alienation of the 
property was also facilitated by the power of two trustees validly to sell the land to a bona fide 
purchaser, overriding the equitable interests of the co-owners of the property. LPA §§ 2(1)(ii), 
27(2). The only major exception to the duty to sell came for property that, like the family home, 
had a "purpose" other than sale, and this development came rather far along in the history of the 
law. See Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd. v. Boland, 1981 App. Cas. 487 (appeal taken from Ch.); 
BURN, supra note 281, at 236-37. The preference for sale and the ease with which sale could be 
accomplished demonstrate the degree to which the common law considered commons property to 
be pathological-an arrangement to be ended as quickly as possible. 
283. Interestingly, American law rejected the English common-law view of the sale of the 
undivided property as the primary means of ending commons property and instead focused on the 
right to partition, a much more standard approach globally. Because of its focus on alienating the 
undivided property, the English common law actually made it more difficult to obtain partition 
than its Continental counterparts. This effectively resulted in an incentive to partition by sale 
(without consent of the parties) rather than in kind. Under the present English law, partition of the 
property by the trustees requires the consent of all of the beneficiaries, a task much more difficult 
than eliminating their interests in the co-owned land through sale and then distributing the 
proceeds. Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act (TLATA), 1996, c. 47, § 7. 
284. The trust structure has been maintained, but its ingrained preference for sale has been 
significantly eroded. The automatic duty to sell and the equitable doctrine of conversion have both 
been abolished. TLATA § 3(3) (abolishing the doctrine of conversion); id. § 5(1) (abolishing the 
duty to sell). And, although two trustees can still sell the property to a bona fide purchaser and 
thus override the equitable interests of the co-beneficiaries, LPA §§ 2(l)(ii), 27(2); TLATA 
§ 8(2), the co-beneficiaries are now empowered to petition the court to stop such a sale, see 
TLATA § 14. Also, the TLATA adds some procedural norms that enable greater participants by 
nontrustees, such as the requirement that, if practicable, the beneficiaries of the trust must be 
consulted and the wishes of the majority followed, at least insofar as these coincide "with the 
general interest of the trust." TLA TA § 11. 
285. Leigh v. Dickeson, [1884-1885] 15 Q.B.D. 60; see also GRAY, supra note 281, at 479. To 
give another example, agreements to restrain partition and alienation are allowed, but only if they are 
a part of the instrument creating the trust, TLAT A § 8, and two trustees may override the agreement 
by selling the land to a bona fide purchaser for value, id. § 16. These trustee powers decrease the 
effectiveness of nonpartition and nonalienation agreements as tools to enable long-term cooperation. 
Also, the trustees themselves must be unanimous in exercising their powers, Luke v. South 
Kensington Hotel Co., [1879] 11 Ch. D. 121, 125, which can make governance of the commons 
more difficult. 
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incentives for ending commons ownership. On balance, though, England 
has moved substantially toward greater support of a liberal commons 
regime, and has left American law behind. 
* * * 
The American law of co-ownership shows what happens when people 
are faced with a particularly hostile legal regime, one that assumes shared 
management cannot work, and then interposes law that guarantees failure. It 
may be too late to reverse the tide for black rural landowners: Too few are 
left, and the legacy of discrimination weighs too heavily. But the lessons of 
their experience have wide applicability everywhere along the frontiers of 
property--cyberspace, genetic research, environmental conservation-
anywhere people want and need to work together, but each individual 
reasonably fears exploitation by the others.286 While the American law of 
co-ownership now fails, it can do better; the liberal commons points the 
way. 
V.CODA 
Any legal regime for commons resource management must grapple 
with three spheres of decisionmaking: what we call the spheres of 
individual dominion, democratic self-governance, and cooperation-
enhancing exit. When law addresses all three spheres successfully, the 
resulting ownership form, a liberal commons, helps people achieve the 
goals of preserving autonomy through exit while promoting the economic 
and social gains from cooperation. Sympathizers of privatization and 
communitarian approaches have seen conflict where there can be-and 
from a global perspective, often is-harmony. All have overlooked the 
facilitative role that law can play in overcoming tragic choice, in particular 
by using law to help catalyze and inculcate the social norms that make the 
liberal commons into a viable, indeed ordinary, way to own property. More 
286. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, 
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 V AND. L. REV. 1162 (2000). Dreyfuss explains, 
The artist, starving in a garret; the dedicated scientist, experimenting in a garage; 
the reclusive professor, burning midnight oil in the office-these are becoming 
endangered species. The creative industries have evolved: collaborative production is 
replacing individual effort .... [Yet,] the intellectual property literature has focused so 
little on the special problems of collaborative work .... Allocating the incidents of 
ownership is not a part of the "mental furniture" of many collaborators; left on their 
own, parties can and do run into significant difficulties .... Redesigning the intellectual 
property system to take explicit account of collaborative production would have 
significant advantages. Well-designed rules reduce transaction costs by functioning as 
off-the-shelf arrangements or starting points for ex ante negotiations. They also serve 
ex post, as default rules for situations in which the parties discover that they have 
omitted key terms from their agreements. 
Id. at 1162, 1164-66. These and similar examples give us confidence that the liberal commons 
construct will have wide scope for further theoretical development and useful application. 
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and more, as "sole and despotic dominion" fades from economic life, 
versions of liberal commons regimes are becoming the dominant form of 
ownership, though a form that has not yet been recognized, studied, and 
supported in a unified way. The metaphor of the "tragedy of the commons" 
has blocked legal imagination and innovation; beyond tragedy, there await 
liberal commons solutions. 
*** 
